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ARTICLES
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE TEMPORARILY UNAVAILABLE JUROR
AND NEW YORK’S MANDATORY 24-HOUR
LIMIT ON THE SEPARATION OF JURORS
DURING DELIBERATIONS
MICHAEL PASINKOFF†
INTRODUCTION
Isolating deliberating trial jurors from contact with the
outside world has been a feature of the American criminal justice
system since the founding of the country. At common law, “[t]his
generally meant no going home at night, no lunch breaks, no
dispersing at all until they reached a verdict.”1 Commonly
referred to as jury sequestration,2 every state has at some point
mandated it as a necessary tool to ensure the integrity of a
criminal jury trial.3 Over the years, however, a wide spectrum of
views has developed regarding the usefulness of this procedure.
Some
states
forbid
sequestration
absent
exceptional
4
circumstances. Other states mandate it in every trial when a
jury begins to deliberate.5 New York State has a unique
approach. While jury sequestration is no longer mandated, a
deliberating jury in New York must return to court to continue
its deliberations on the next day the court is open for business. If
all deliberating jurors do not return the next day, even if due to
the most extreme personal emergency, the law arguably
mandates a mistrial if the defendant does not consent to a longer
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for their assistance. The views reflected in this article are solely those of the author
and not those of the New York County District Attorney’s Office.
1
Dietz v. Bouldin, __U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2016).
2
Sequestration as it relates to juries is defined as a “custodial isolation of a trial
jury to prevent tampering and exposure to publicity . . . .” Sequestration, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
3
See infra Part V.
4
See infra Part V.
5
See infra Part V.
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recess.6 As illustrated by the hypothetical below, the remedy of
an automatic mistrial in this circumstance does nothing to
protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury;7 nor does it ensure that the trial is a fair one.
I.

A HYPOTHETICAL “24-HOUR RULE” VIOLATION

A grand jury in New York County (Manhattan) returned an
indictment, charging John Smith with Murder in the Second
Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 125.25(1), and two
counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree,
in violation of New York Penal Law § 265.03. At the trial, which
lasted more than two months, the prosecution called over sixty
witnesses and presented over 100 exhibits. At least two essential
witnesses had moved to other states and had to be flown back to
New York at the prosecution’s expense.8 Several witnesses were
reluctant to testify, fearing for their safety and the safety of their
families. In fact, due to safety concerns, at least one witness had
to be relocated after testifying.
Given the anticipated length of the trial, it took over one
week to select a jury of twelve individuals who could not only be
fair and impartial but who could also devote two months to the
trial.9 The expected length of the trial also led the trial judge to
direct the selection of four alternate jurors.10 Many potential
jurors had legitimate commitments that kept them from serving
on a jury for a two-month trial; the jurors who were selected,
although inconvenienced by the significant length of the trial,
made the necessary adjustments to their schedules, consistent
with the obligations of jury service.11 One potential juror, who
6

See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 280.10; 310.10(2) (McKinney 2018).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to
provide the right to trial by jury for serious offenses); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2
(guaranteeing the right to trial by jury).
8
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 640.10(3) (providing the procedure for issuing
subpoenas to out-of-state witnesses).
9
New York mandates that “every trial of an indictment must be a jury trial”
consisting of twelve jurors. Id. §§ 260.10; 270.05(1). A trial jury of an information
charging a misdemeanor in a local criminal court consists of six jurors.
Id. § 360.10(1).
10
The law also permits, but does not require, the selection of up to six alternate
jurors in a trial of an indictment, id. § 270.30(1), and up to two alternates in a trial
of a misdemeanor in a local criminal court. Id. § 360.35(1). The exact number of
alternates selected, if any, is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge.
11
Mere inconvenience is an insufficient basis for excusing a person from jury
service. See People v. Wilson, 52 A.D.3d 941, 942, 859 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (3d Dep’t
7
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was ultimately selected, informed the court that he had a
weekend trip to Seattle planned, which could not be rescheduled.
However, because he was scheduled to leave Friday evening and
return Sunday night, the juror’s travel plans did not pose any
impediment to jury service.
Although the trial judge was diligent in ensuring that the
trial progressed expeditiously, there were several interruptions,
including one day each week for the judge to deal with the
approximately 200 other cases on his calendar.12 In addition, the
trial was not in session on one day because a juror had a medical
procedure and on another day for a religious holiday observed by
several of the jurors.13 Although the law leaves to the trial
court’s discretion the length and number of recesses,14 the judge
presiding at Smith’s trial, mindful of the need to keep the case on
schedule, granted recesses infrequently and only for exceptional
circumstances. When the court did grant recesses, or when the
business for the day had concluded, the court “permit[ted the

2008) (“Slight interference with employment or inconvenience related to sitting on a
jury are insufficient grounds to support a challenge for cause.”). If a juror, despite
financial loss or other personal inconvenience, gives assurance that he or she can be
fair and impartial, a court cannot grant a challenge for cause based on such factors.
See, e.g., People v. Butler, 281 A.D.2d 333, 333, 722 N.Y.S.2d 510, 510 (1st Dep’t
2001) (“The court properly declined to discharge a sworn juror when, prior to the
completion of jury selection, the juror expressed concern and bitterness about the
time and money he was losing.”). However, when jury service “would cause undue
hardship or extreme inconvenience to [a potential juror], a person under his or her
care or supervision, or the public,” a potential juror can be excused from service. See
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 517(c) (McKinney 2018); People v. Mulinar, 185 A.D.2d 996, 998,
587 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (2d Dep’t 1992) (court properly discharged “five of the seven
prospective jurors . . . due to physical impairments, family obligations, or work
commitments”).
12
There are approximately thirty trial judges who sit in New York County
Supreme Court, the trial-level court for felony cases. Twenty of these judges have a
designated calendar day. See Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Term Schedule, Term
9, NYCOURTS.GOV, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/criminal/termschedule.pdf
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
13
Christmas is the only religious holiday officially recognized by the New York
State Court System. See Future Court Terms & Holidays, NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/admin/holidayschedule.shtml (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
14
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.45 (allowing a court to permit a jury to
separate during “pre-deliberation” recesses without specifying a time limit on the
length of any such recess); see also People v. Diggins, 11 N.Y.3d 518, 524, 900 N.E.2d
959, 962–63, 872 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411–12 (2008) (“[t]he granting of an adjournment for
any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court”)
(quoting Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 283, 471 N.E.2d 447, 454, 481
N.Y.S.2d 675, 682 (1984)).
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jury] to separate,”15 to return to their respective homes, and come
back on the next scheduled trial date. That was usually, but not
always, the next day the courthouse was open for business.
At the close of the two-month evidentiary portion of the trial,
the defense and prosecution delivered their final arguments,
which took a total of two days.16 The jury was then given
extensive legal instructions before retiring to deliberate on a
Friday.17 As required by New York Criminal Procedure Law
(“CPL”) § 310.10(1), the jury was taken to a conference room
immediately outside of the courtroom to conduct its deliberations,
where they were “continuously kept together under the
supervision of a court officer or court officers.”18 The court
officers, “[e]xcept when so authorized by the court or when
performing administerial duties with respect to the
jurors, . . . [did] not speak to or communicate with them or permit
any other person to do so.”19 The supervising court officers at
Smith’s trial also took custody of each juror’s cellular telephone.
If the jurors needed any physical or testimonial evidence, or had
legal questions, they communicated their requests in notes,
signed by the foreperson, which were given to a supervising court
officer and delivered to the judge.20 The jury was then returned

15

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.45.
Id. §§ 260.30(8), (9).
17
Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets forth the requirements for a
judge’s charge to the jury. Id. § 300.10. Further, CPL § 300.10(5), provides that
“[b]oth before and after the court’s charge, the parties may submit requests to
charge, either orally or in writing, and the court must rule promptly upon each
request.” Id. § 300.10(5). This is typically done at a “charge conference” held before
the court instructs the jury. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 26 N.Y.3d 170, 172, 42
N.E.3d 688, 690, 21 N.Y.S.3d 191, 193 (2015) (“At the charge conference, Supreme
Court indicated that it would, at defendant's request, give a charge on the
justification defense.”).
18
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(1).
19
Id.
20
A jury may “request the court for further instruction or information with
respect to the law, with respect to the content or substance of any trial evidence, or
with respect to any other matter pertinent to the jury’s consideration of the case.”
Id. § 310.30. While the statute does not mandate that the request be in writing, the
practice in New York State is that a request be made in the form of a note. See
People v. O’Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 277–278, 579 N.E.2d 189, 192, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159,
162 (1991); Exhibits, Readback & Law Questions, NYCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Exhibits_Readback_Law.pdf
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (instructing jurors to transmit requests via a note signed
by the foreperson).
16
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to the courtroom and the trial judge, in the presence of the
parties, responded to the jury’s inquiry. No other contact with
the jury during deliberations was permitted.
Until 1995, New York law required juries to be sequestered
from the time they began deliberations until they reached a
verdict.21 If no verdict was reached before the end of a court day,
jurors were taken to hotels and returned to court the next
morning to continue their deliberations. In 1995, the mandatory
sequestration rule was relaxed with the enactment of CPL §
310.10(2).22 The initial version of CPL § 310.10(2) did not apply
to the most serious cases, including murder and other violent
felonies.23 That section, which was subsequently amended in
2001 to apply to all cases, provides, in relevant part:
At any time after the jury has been charged or commenced its
deliberations, and after notice to the parties and affording such
parties an opportunity to be heard on the record outside of the
presence of the jury, the court may declare the deliberations to
be in recess and may thereupon direct the jury to suspend its
deliberations and to separate for a reasonable period of time to
be specified by the court, not to exceed twenty-four hours,
except that in the case of a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, such
separation may extend beyond such twenty-four hour period.
Before each recess, the court must admonish the jury as
provided in § 270.40 of this chapter and direct it not to resume
its deliberations until all twelve jurors have reassembled in the
designated place at the termination of the declared recess.24

21

1970 N.Y. Laws 2281 (enacted as N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10).
Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 83, 1995 N.Y. Laws 111–12.
23
Id. The 1995 version of Criminal Procedure Law § 310.10(2) did not apply to
an indictment charging a “class A felony or a class B violent felony offense or class C
violent felony.” Class A felonies include: Murder in the First Degree, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2018); Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25; Aggravated Murder, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.26; Arson in the First
Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.20; Kidnapping in the First Degree, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 135.25 and certain serious drug offenses, such as Criminal Sale of a
Controlled Substance in the First Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.43. For a list of
class B and C violent felonies, which include various degrees of assault, robbery and
burglary, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(1).
24
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(2). This statutory provision is a limited
exception to the mandatory sequestration provision of CPL § 310.10(1), which is still
in effect. Under CPL § 310.10(1), a jury, once deliberations begin, must, “except as
otherwise provided in [CPL § 310.10(2)] be continuously kept together under the
supervision of a court officer or court officers.” During each of the recesses, the trial
court is required to give to the jury certain instructions designed to ensure that it
does not resume deliberations until all twelve jurors are back in the jury room, and
22
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According to its plain language, the statute permits a
separation for “up to twenty-four hours,” but court holidays and
weekends are not counted in this time.
Thus, if jury
deliberations are declared in recess at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday, the
statute requires that the court direct jurors to return to
deliberate on Monday before 5:00 p.m. If jury deliberations are
declared in recess at the close of business on a Thursday at 5:00
p.m., the statute requires that the court direct jurors to return to
deliberate on Friday before 5:00 p.m. In practice, jurors are
directed to return to court the following day at 9:30 a.m. to
resume deliberations.
The statute, however, is technically
satisfied if deliberations resume, even for just a few moments,
within the 24-hour period. In other words, deliberations of any
length serve to “reset” the 24-hour clock.
The statute does not control until the jury begins
deliberations, even if all the evidence has been submitted, the
parties have delivered summations, and the court has given
most, but not all, of its final instructions. Until deliberations
have begun, recesses are controlled by CPL § 270.45, which
grants the judge unfettered discretion and sets no time limit.25
Thus, a trial judge who is otherwise prepared to charge a jury on
a Monday morning, but who anticipates juror unavailability on
Tuesday, can delay the charge and the start of deliberations until
Wednesday morning—after the potential scheduling issue has
passed.
The statute also does not control after the jury has informed
the court that it has reached a verdict.26 Thus, in the rare
circumstance when a juror becomes ill after the verdict is
reached, but before it is formally announced in court, there is no
requirement that the juror return to court or that the verdict be
announced within the time period set forth in CPL § 310.10(2).
Accordingly, at Smith’s trial, as the close of business drew
near on Friday without a verdict, the trial judge, “after notice to
the parties, and affording such parties an opportunity to be heard
on the record outside of the presence of the jury,”27 instructed the
that it is not improperly exposed to any information about the case that was not
presented in court. Id. §§ 310.10(2); 270.40.
25
See supra note 14.
26
See People v. Monroig, 223 A.D.2d 730, 731, 637 N.Y.S.2d 451, 451 (2d Dep’t
1996) (finding no abuse of discretion in declining to sequester jury after verdict was
reached, but before it could be fully read into the record, because of the sudden
illness of a juror).
27
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(2).
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court officers to tell the jurors to cease deliberations and return
to the courtroom. When all jurors were present, the court
instructed them not to discuss the case until they were all
present in the jury room on Monday. The court also admonished
the jury not to speak with “anyone else upon any subject
connected with the trial; [not to] read or listen to any
accounts . . . of the case reported by newspapers or other news
media; [and not to] visit or view the premises or place where the
offense [was] allegedly committed . . . .”28 The court reminded the
jury not to do any internet research on the case, and to “promptly
report . . . any incident within their knowledge involving an
attempt by any person improperly to influence any member of
the jury.”29 This was the same admonition that the trial judge
gave before each recess—an instruction that the law presumes
the jurors will follow.30 The jury was then dismissed from the
courtroom with instructions to return on Monday.
Eleven of the deliberating jurors returned on Monday as
instructed. The twelfth juror informed the court by telephone
that his return flight to New York City from Seattle was delayed
until late that evening, and consequently, he would not be able to
return to court until Tuesday morning. Although there were
several alternate jurors available, Smith would not consent to a
substitution.31 Since deliberations would not resume until the
next day, the recess would be more than the statutorily
authorized period permitted by CPL § 310.10(2). The court asked
the juror to see if any other flights were available that would
facilitate an earlier return. After all, if the juror returned to
court at any time before 5:00 p.m., deliberations could resume,
even for just a few moments, and the statutory mandate would be
satisfied. The juror informed the court that no earlier flights
were available.

28

Id. CPL § 310.10(2) requires that these instructions, codified in CPL § 270.40,
be given prior to any time that a deliberating jury is allowed to separate. See, e.g.,
Jury Separation During Deliberations, NYCOURTS.GOV, http://www.nycourts.gov/
judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Jury_Separation_Rev.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
29
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.40.
30
See People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266, 273–74, 926 N.E.2d 240, 245, 899
N.Y.S.2d 733, 738 (2010).
31
CPL § 270.35(1) requires a defendant to consent, in writing, to substitution of
a sworn juror with an alternate juror after deliberations have begun.
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Smith’s attorney was obviously aware of this juror’s travel
plans because the juror had relayed this information to the court
during jury selection.32 Nonetheless, although Smith’s attorney
was unable to articulate any prejudice that his client would
suffer from the brief delay in resuming deliberations, he moved
for a mistrial, which the court granted with great reluctance.
Unlike other time limitations specified in the Criminal Procedure
Law, which may be extended “for good cause shown,” CPL §
310.10(2) on its face affords judges no discretion to extend a
recess in deliberations beyond the period specified in the
statute.33 In considering Smith’s application, the court was
mindful of its obligation to construe laws “so as to give effect to
the plain meaning of the words used [by the Legislature].”34
Without any controlling appellate authority granting trial judges
authority to extend recesses beyond the period specified in CPL §
310.10(2), and cognizant of the fact that this statute was a
relatively recent and limited exception to the long tradition of
mandatory sequestration of criminal trial jurors in New York,
the trial court concluded that a recess beyond the statutorily
authorized period would be contrary to the legislative intent.
Given the plain language of CPL § 310.10(2), defendants
argue that judges have no discretion to react to unexpected, yet
temporary, instances of juror unavailability. They contend that
the statute mandates a mistrial when deliberations do not
resume on the next day the court is open for business. These
applications are sometimes granted even when defendants have
suffered no prejudice from the delay in resuming deliberations.
And since a mistrial granted at the defendant’s request is not
subject to appellate review, prosecutors have no remedy.35
32

See supra text following note 11.
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80(3) (authorizing, for good cause,
extension of the time after which an incarcerated defendant must be indicted before
being released from custody); id. § 700.70 (providing that notice of an eavesdropping
investigation must be served within fifteen days after arraignment unless good
cause shown); id. § 710.30(2) (requiring prosecution to serve within fifteen days after
arraignment notice of any statements made by defendant which prosecution seeks to
offer on direct case—a period which can be extended by the court for good cause
shown); id. § 250.10(2) (notice of psychiatric defense must be served within thirty
days of arraignment, although court can extend the time for good cause shown).
34
Myers v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d 1, 12, 85 N.E.3d 57, 61, 62 N.Y.S.3d 838,
842 (2017) (quoting People v. Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d 53, 58, 647 N.E.2d 758, 760, 623
N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (1995)).
35
The prosecution’s right to appeal is governed by statute and only those orders
listed in CPL § 450.20 may be appealed by the prosecution. These include orders
dismissing an accusatory instrument, setting aside a verdict, or granting a motion to
33
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When courts grant mistrials under these circumstances, the
state is put through the expense and burden of retrying an entire
case even when there is no suggestion that the original trial was
anything but fair. The mischief caused by this statute is not
confined to unnecessary mistrials. The statutory mandate has
other consequences, such as assigning temporary judges to cover
a trial judge’s calendar day, scheduling jury deliberations during
a calendar day (when responding to jury notes can be difficult
and time consuming),36 and ordering jurors to appear in court
even when they have a serious personal emergency.37
Various bills have been proposed, but never enacted, to give
New York trial judges express statutory discretion to suspend
jury deliberations for a period longer than that currently
permitted by CPL § 310.10(2).38 Nonetheless, based upon earlier
suppress evidence that renders the remaining evidence insufficient to sustain the
prosecution’s burden of proof. An improperly granted mistrial is not one of the
statutorily authorized grounds for an appeal by the prosecution. Further, it is
unlikely that a writ of prohibition, brought pursuant to Article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, would be a viable method by which the prosecution
could challenge a mistrial granted for an alleged violation of CPL § 310.10(2). See
Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 569, 523 N.E.2d 297, 300, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24
(1988) (“Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where
there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court—in cases where judicial
authority is challenged—acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in
excess of its authorized power.”). By contrast, Article 78 relief is available to a
defendant who claims that a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity and
that a second trial is barred on double jeopardy grounds. See, e.g., In re Capellan v.
Stone, 49 A.D.3d 121, 124–25, 849 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532–33 (1st Dep’t 2008).
36
There may well be times where, given the posture of jury deliberations, a trial
court, in its discretion may think it prudent that the jury continue deliberating
through a calendar day. However, this decision should be entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
37
The trial court would also have to make an inquiry to determine whether the
personal emergency rendered the juror grossly unqualified to continuing serving.
See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 227 A.D.2d 162, 162, 642 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634 (1st Dep’t
1996) (trial court properly discharged juror suffering from stomach flu since the
juror stated that the illness “might . . . affect[] his ability to concentrate and
deliberate”).
38
In 2012, the New York State Senate introduced a bill authorizing the
suspension of jury deliberations “upon good cause shown” for up to 72 hours. N.Y.
State Senate, S06679, 199 Legislative Session (N.Y. 2012). The bill was not approved
by the Senate. In 2016, a similar bill was introduced but again was not approved by
the Legislature. See N.Y. State Assembly, A07031, 201 Legislative Session (N.Y.
2016) (permitting suspension of jury deliberations until close of business the next
day or, for good cause shown, beyond close of business on the third day following
recess of jury deliberations unless both parties consent to a longer period). Finally,
in 2017, a third attempt was made to amend the law. The Legislature has yet to
adopt this amendment. See N.Y. State Assembly, A07448, 201 Legislative Session
(N.Y. 2017) (permitting suspension of jury deliberations until the close of business
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versions of New York’s sequestration rule and case law
interpreting those provisions, this Article contends that CPL §
310.10(2) is not violated when deliberations do not resume within
the prescribed statutory period due to an unexpected delay
occasioned by a juror’s temporary inability to return to court.
Rather, a violation occurs only when, in the absence of such a
circumstance, a court orders a recess in deliberations, over the
timely objection of the defense, and directs the jury to return on a
day other than the next day that court is open for business.
Further, even when there is an alleged violation of the statute, a
defendant should still be required to show how he was prejudiced
by the delay in resuming deliberations before a mistrial is
granted.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the law
regarding judicial control over jurors, both before and after
deliberations begin. Part III discusses the historical origins of
jury sequestration and the path to the enactment of the current
version of CPL § 310.10(2). Part IV discusses case law relevant
to CPL § 310.10(2). Part V surveys the law in the other fortynine states, none of which has a per se reversal rule in cases
where a deliberating jury is separated out of necessity. Part VI
recommends an amendment to the statute that would permit
recesses in jury deliberations for as long as is necessary to
accommodate the temporary unavailability of a deliberating juror
or to address an unforeseen circumstance that makes it
impractical for deliberations to resume.
The proposed
amendment would also permit deliberations to be adjourned for
up to 48 hours in non-emergency situations to afford judges the
ability to deal with non-trial matters at least one day per week.
II. JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER JURORS
Under New York law, a trial judge has a sliding scale of
discretion, from jury selection to jury discharge. A judge’s
discretion is at its greatest during jury selection, when he or she
may excuse potential jurors for cause.39 A court may grant either

on the next business day or “for good cause shown, beyond close of business on the
third day following recess of jury deliberations”). For the complete text of all of these
proposed amendments, see http://nyassembly.gov/leg (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
39
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 2018). When jurors express a
doubt about their own impartiality, “[j]udges should either elicit some unequivocal
assurance of their ability to be impartial when that is appropriate, or excuse the
juror when that is appropriate, since, in most cases, the worst the court will have
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side’s challenge for cause and dismiss a prospective juror when
the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from
rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced
at the trial.”40 There is no need, if the prosecution is making the
challenge, for the defendant to consent before the prospective
juror is excused.41 There is also no statutory restriction on the
length of the jury selection process, or on any recesses taken
during the process.42
The standard for removal of a sworn juror and replacement
with an alternate juror is more onerous.43 CPL § 270.35
authorizes the trial court to replace a sworn juror with an
alternate juror if the sworn juror “is unable to continue serving
by reason of illness or other incapacity, . . . or the court finds,
from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that
[the juror] is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . .”44 Prior
done . . . is to have replaced one impartial juror with another impartial juror.”
People v. Harris, 19 N.Y.3d 679, 685, 978 N.E.2d 1246, 1250, 954 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780
(2012) (internal citations omitted).
40
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(b); see also People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d
600, 611, 730 N.E.2d 932, 938, 709 N.Y.S.2d 134, 140 (2000). In addition, depending
on the level of offense, the law affords each party a certain number of “peremptory
challenges,” which can be used to strike a potential juror without a showing that the
juror cannot be fair and impartial. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25. An erroneous
ruling granting a challenge for cause by the People is not reversible error “unless the
people have exhausted their peremptory challenges at the time or exhaust them
before the selection of the jury is complete.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(2).
Similarly, an “erroneous ruling by the court denying a challenge for cause by the
defendant does not constitute reversible error unless the defendant has exhausted
his peremptory challenges at the time or . . . before the selection of the jury is
complete.” Id.
41
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(2); see also People v. Smith, 136 A.D.3d 532,
533, 25 N.Y.S.2d 178, 178 (1st Dep’t 2012) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the court
improperly granted “two challenges for cause by the People”).
42
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15; see also People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744,
745, 551 N.E.2d 90, 91, 551 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (1989) (finding a fifteen-minute time
limit on each attorney’s voir dire in the first two rounds and a ten-minute limit for
the third round to be an appropriate exercise of discretion). But see, e.g., People v.
Steward, 17 N.Y.3d 104, 107, 950 N.E.2d 480, 482, 926 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (2011)
(finding that a “five minute limitation on counsel for the questioning of jurors . . . in
this multiple felony case” was an abuse of discretion).
43
See People v. Henderson, 74 A.D.3d 1567, 1570, 903 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593 (3d
Dep’t 2010) (“This exacting test, which requires a greater showing than a for-cause
challenge, may not be based upon speculation as to a juror's possible partiality
premised upon equivocal responses.”) (internal citations omitted).
44
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1). See People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 299,
506 N.E.2d 901, 906, 514 N.Y.S.2d 191, 196 (1987) (holding that, when a trial court
learns that a juror may have become grossly unqualified, the court is obligated to
make a “probing and tactful inquiry” of the juror, and must put the reasons for its
ruling on the record).
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to discharging a sworn juror based on unavailability, the trial
judge is required to “make a reasonably thorough inquiry . . . .”45
Trial courts are further authorized to presume a juror
unavailable for continued service if “there is no reasonable
likelihood such juror will be appearing[] in court within two
hours of the time set by the court for the trial to resume.”46 If the
juror is discharged prior to deliberations, the defendant’s consent
is not required for the trial court to discharge and replace the
juror with an alternate juror.47
A trial judge is vested with almost unfettered discretion to
adjourn the trial and “permit separation of the jurors . . . at any
stage of the trial up until submission of the case to the jury.”48
CPL § 270.45 authorizes the trial court to permit a jury to
“separate during recesses and adjournments.”49
Although
lengthy mid-trial adjournments are generally undesirable, there
is no limitation on the number or length of adjournments that a
judge can authorize during the pendency of a trial.50
Once the jury begins to deliberate, a trial judge’s discretion
with respect to replacement of sworn jurors with alternate jurors
and adjournments of deliberations all but disappears. First,
while a trial judge can discharge a deliberating juror without the
consent of the defendant, an alternate juror cannot replace the
discharged juror unless the defendant signs a waiver, in open
court, consenting to the substitution.51 If the defendant neither
consents to the substitution, nor consents to an eleven-person
jury, the court must declare a mistrial.52 Further, as noted
above, any adjournments of the trial after deliberations
commence are subject to the restriction of CPL § 310.10(2).53
45

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(2)(a).
Id.
47
See id.
48
People v. D’Alvia, 171 A.D.2d 96, 103, 575 N.Y.S. 495, 500 (2d Dep’t 1991).
49
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.45.
50
See People v. Molinas, 21 A.D.2d 384, 385–86, 250 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (1st
Dep’t 1964) (finding that a “five week adjournment of trial necessitated by illness of
the trial judge was not grounds for a mistrial”); People v. Cooper, 173 A.D.2d 551,
552, 570 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (2d Dep’t 1991) (holding that the trial court properly
declined to declare a mistrial based upon a six-week interruption of the trial when
the defense counsel fell ill).
51
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1). Such consent “must be in writing and must
be signed by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court.” Id.;
see People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 443–44, 880 N.E.2d 863, 866, 850 N.Y.S.2d
377, 380 (2007).
52
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1).
53
See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.
46
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III. HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF JURY
SEQUESTRATION IN NEW YORK
Historically, sequestration not only meant isolating jurors
from the outside world; it also included keeping them “without
meat, drink, fire, or candle . . . till they are all unanimously
agreed.”54 This was done not to ensure jurors’ impartiality, but to
compel them to reach a verdict. In the time of Edward I, King of
England from 1272 to 1307, the “sheriff could cause the jurors in
an assize to be kept sine cibo et potu until they agreed.”55 Judges
at the time also had the option to “afforce the jury,” namely by
“adding jurors to the majority until twelve were found to be
unanimous.”56 When afforcing juries became obsolete in the time
of Edward III, “lock[ing] up the jury in a room, without meat,
drink, or fire, or candle” became one of the most powerful
methods to compel a unanimous verdict.57

54

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375–76
(15th Edition 1809). There are other historical instances, apart from a jury trial,
where isolation has been used to compel and accelerate agreement. The most wellknown example is the isolation of cardinals during the election of a new pope. This
practice was instituted in 1274 when Pope Gregory X called a “general council of the
Church . . . .” MICHAEL WALSH, THE CONCLAVE: A SOMETIMES SECRET AND
OCCASIONALLY BLOODY HISTORY OF PAPAL ELECTIONS 85 (2003). The council issued
various decrees which mandated certain procedures to be followed by the cardinals
who were charged with the selection of a new pope. Id. Much like sequestration of a
jury, cardinals called to elect a pope were required, during the election process, to
“live in common in one room, with no partition or curtain.” Id. Until a new pope was
elected, the cardinals were locked into one room, no person was allowed to speak
with them and “[i]f, after three days, there has been no election, they are allowed
only one dish at lunch and supper, then after five days only bread, wine, and water
are to be given [to] them until they come up with a pope.” Id.
Another historical instance was the election of the Roman Emperor in the 1300s.
In 1356, Charles IV of Germany published the “Golden Bull of Charles IV” which
outlined the election process. SIR ROBERT COMYN, CHARLES IV OF GERMANY
PUBLISHES HIS GOLDEN BULL reprinted in 7 THE GREAT EVENTS BY FAMOUS
HISTORIANS 160 (Rossiter Johnson, ed. 1905). The process required that upon the
death of the emperor, seven electors were to be summoned to Frankfort. Id. Further,
the electors were forbidden from leaving the city before an emperor was elected. Id.
If the electors after thirty days had still not elected a new emperor, their diets would
be restricted to only bread and water. Id. at 161.
55
JOHN PROFATT, TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 77, at 113 (1877). Sine cibo et
potu is translated as “without food or water”; assize is defined as “[a] session of a
court or council; [or] a meeting of a court presided over by a judge or judges who
travel periodically from town to town.” Assize, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
56
PROFATT, supra note 55, § 77, at 113.
57
Id. § 77, at 113 n.4.
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These practices were employed with little concern that a
defendant receive a fair trial, or that the jury remain impartial.58
Jurors would almost always convict a person, especially in cases
involving high treason or crimes against the state, regardless of
the actual evidence presented at trial.59 It was widely known
that “the royal will or wish” for a specific verdict was “without
opposition carried into effect [by a jury].”60 Indeed, “to be accused
of a crime against the state and to be convicted were almost the
same thing”61 and jurors were fearful of imprisonment should
they return a verdict of not guilty. Convictions were quick and
almost guaranteed.62 For example, during the trial of John
Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, for High Treason, the jury returned
a verdict of guilty. Yet they did so “onely [sic] for safety of their
goods and lives, which they were well assured to lose, in case
they had acquitted him.”63
Up until the late 1600s, jurors could be legally punished or
imprisoned by the presiding judge for returning a verdict that the
court found improper. In the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton
for High Treason, after the jury returned a verdict of not guilty,
“the court being dissatisfied with the [v]erdict, committed the
[j]ury to prison.”64 Similarly, in 1670, William Penn and William
Mead were indicted for “tumultuous assembly.”65 The indictment
charged that the two men, “with force and arms, in the parish of
St. Bennet Grace-church in Bridge-ward, London, in the street
called Grace-church street, unlawfully and tumultuously did
assemble and congregate themselves together, to the disturbance
of the peace of the said lord the king.”66

58

Id. § 77, at 114.
Id. § 35, at 52.
60
Id.
61
Id. § 36, at 53.
62
During the Trial of Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, the jury “went together”
and “[w]ithin one hour after, . . . the noblemen of the [j]ury came every one back”
and returned a verdict of guilty. Trial of Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, 1
HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 1258 (1816). In the trial of Sir Thomas More for treason,
the jury withdrew from the courtroom and returned fifteen minutes later with a
guilty verdict. Trial of Sir Thomas More for High Treason, 1 HOWELL’S STATE
TRIALS 392 (1816).
63
Trial of John Fisher, 1 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 402 (1816).
64
Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 900 (1816).
65
Trial of William Penn and William Mead, 6 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 952
(1670).
66
Id. at 955.
59
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After the trial was completed, “[t]he [j]ury were commanded
up to agree upon their verdict . . . . After an hour and a half’s
time eight [jurors] came down agreed, but four remained above,”
apparently unwilling to convict Mead or Penn.67 The court then
“used many unworthy threats to the four that dissented,” and
told the foreperson, “you are the cause of this disturbance and
manifestly shew yourself an abettor of faction; I shall set a mark
upon you.”68
The jury, after listening to this “menacing
language,” was sent to “consider of bringing in their verdict, and
after some considerable time they returned to the Court.”69
While the jury found the two “[g]uilty of speaking in Gracechurch street,”70 they would not return a verdict of guilty for the
The court
actual crime charged—unlawful assembly.71
threatened the jurors by telling them that “[t]he law of England
will not allow you to part till you have given in your [v]erdict,”72
and warned “you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict
that the court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without
meat, drink, fire, and tobacco . . . we will have a verdict . . . or
you shall starve for it.”73 The jury was brought back to court the
next morning, and found both Penn and Mead not guilty.74 The
jurors were all fined and imprisoned until the fine was paid.75
The foreperson, Edward Bushel, filed a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. The reviewing court noted the absence of any allegation
that the jury “acquitted the persons indicted, against full and
manifest evidence corruptly.”76
Accordingly, “how manifest
soever the evidence was, if it were not manifest to [the jury], and
that they believed it such, it was not a finable fault, nor
deserving imprisonment.”77 The writ was ultimately granted and
the jurors were released from prison.78

67

Id. at 961.
Id.
69
Id. at 962.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 964–65.
72
Id. at 962.
73
Id. at 963.
74
Id. at 966.
75
Id. at 967–68.
76
Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, 6 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 1005
(1670).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1024.
68
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Bushel’s Case, decided in 1670, is widely regarded as the
seminal case for the independence of a jury.79 Following this
decision, imprisonment could no longer be used to punish a jury
for returning a verdict that the trial court found disagreeable.80
However, “[i]n the early stages of the legal history of England
many of the rules regulating the conduct of the court and jury on
trials were very strict.”81 Notably, jurors “were not permitted to
separate, after they had been charged by the court, until they
had rendered a verdict.”82 This rule was “carried so far that, if
the jury failed to agree during the session of the court . . . [they]
were held in confinement until they rendered a verdict.”83 It
became “an established principle of the common law, in relation
to the trial by jury, that after the jurors are once impaneled, they
have no right to disperse, or take refreshments without the leave
of the court.”84
Although courts slowly began to recognize the limited value
of sequestration, New York case law from the early 1800s reveals
that it was still the practice to sequester jurors and deprive them
of various necessities because appeals were based upon the fact
that jurors separated without court authorization and
supervision. In Smith v. Thompson, “two of the jurors eluded the
care of the constable, left the jury room, and one of them
remained at a neighboring tavern during the night.”85 Both of
the jurors returned the next morning and found for the plaintiff.
The court held that “[i]t was clearly irregular in the two jurors to
separate from their fellows,” but declined to set aside the
verdict.86 In People v. Douglass, two of the jurors separated from
the rest of the jury without permission from the trial judge.87
The two jurors not only ate and consumed liquor, but freely
“conversed on the subject of the trial.”88
As an implicit
79
Mark Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency and Accountability in the Litigation
Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 27 (1990).
80
See Nancy Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV., 877,
950, n.336 (1999) (“Although this case did not officially recognize the right of juries
to decide questions of law, it did establish that juries could not be punished for
acquitting a defendant, thus establishing the power of the criminal jury to nullify.”).
81
Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 553 (1859).
82
Id. at 554.
83
Id.
84
People v. Ransom, 7 Wend. 417, 423 (Sup. Ct. 1831).
85
Smith v. Thompson, 1 Cow. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1823).
86
Id.
87
People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. 26, 33 (Sup. Ct. 1825).
88
Id. at 35.
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recognition of the limited value of sequestration, the New York
Supreme Court of Judicature held that separation of a jury
against the orders of the court would not be a basis to set aside
the verdict in the absence of “any farther abuse.”89 However,
given the allegations of jury misconduct during the separation in
Douglass, a new trial was ordered.90
What is notable about Douglass is that it recognized the
authority of judges to permit a jury to separate during the trial,
and declined to adopt a per se reversal rule even in cases of
unauthorized jury separations.91 The Douglass court and other
New York courts at the time relied on King v. Kinnear, for the
authority to separate a deliberating jury.92 In Kinnear, the
defendants were indicted for misdemeanor conspiracy.93 The
trial began at 10:00 a.m. and continued until approximately
11:00 p.m., when the prosecution finally finished presenting
evidence.94 Given the late hour, it became “a matter of necessity
to adjourn” the case until the following morning.95 The jury,
without either the knowledge or consent of the defendants or
judge, “separated and went to their respective homes.”96 The
unauthorized separation was not discovered until after the jury
reached a verdict. In declining to set aside the verdict, the court
held that “standing alone,” an unauthorized separation of a jury
“is not sufficient to vacate the verdict.”97 The court further held
that “the law has vested a discretion in the [j]udge, to allow the
jury to go to their homes, during the necessary adjournment in
each particular case; and, therefore, that no sufficient ground has
been laid [to set aside the verdict].”98

89

Id. at 36. The Supreme Court of Judicature was a court of general as well as
appellate jurisdiction. See Williams Press Inc. v. Flavin, 35 N.Y.2d 499, 503, 323
N.E.2d 693, 694, 364 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (1974). It was the highest court of law in
New York until 1846. Id.
90
Douglass, 4 Cow. at 35–36.
91
Id. at 36. (“We do mean to be understood, however, as saying, that the mere
separation of the jury, without any farther abuse, is not sufficient ground for setting
aside a verdict; though it may deserve severe reprehension from the court.”).
92
Douglass, 4 Cow. at 33; King v. Kinnear, 2 B. & Ald. 462 (K.B. 1819).
93
Kinnear, 2 B. & Ald. at 462.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 464.
96
Id. at 462.
97
Id. at 466.
98
Id. at 465.
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Kinnear was relied upon by New York courts for two related
propositions—that a court had the authority to separate a jury
contrary to the common law requirement of sequestration, and
that separation of a jury, without more, is an insufficient basis to
set aside a verdict.99 Kinnear makes another equally important
point: keeping a jury in court for long periods of time may be
“most injurious to the cause of the defendants, that their case
should be heard by a jury, whose minds were exhausted by
fatigue.”100 This observation is an acknowledgment of the
coercive nature of mandatory sequestration and its potential to
do more harm than good.
In 1859, the New York Court of Appeals,101 the state’s
highest court, echoed this sentiment in Stephens v. People:
Where jurors are subjected to a long confinement their patience
is exhausted, their power of endurance is weakened
and . . . unable to give the necessary consideration to a long and
often complicated case, involving the life of a fellow-man, when

99

Ransom, 7 Wend. at 424; Smith v. Thompson, 1 Cow. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1823);
Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 557 (1859).
100
Kinnear, 2 B. & Ald., at 464.
101
New York appellate courts are comprised of various intermediate appellate
courts, as well as the Court of Appeals. An appeal from a judgment of the Supreme
Court or County Court (the trial-level courts for felony cases) must be taken to the
appellate division of the department in which such judgment was entered. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.60 (McKinney 2018). New York State is divided into four
“departments” and accordingly, there is an appellate division for each department.
See New York State Judicial Departments and Districts, NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Court/Dept-Districts.html (last visited, Aug. 26,
2018).
Criminal defendants have a statutory right to appeal a judgment of conviction to
an intermediate appellate court. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.10(1). Intermediate
appellate courts can review rulings when the alleged errors have been “preserved”
by an objection, made with specificity. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2). The
intermediate appellate court may also review unpreserved claims “in the interest of
justice,” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 470.15(3)(c), (6)(a), or may find that a conviction
was “in whole or in part, against the weight of the evidence.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 470.15(5).
An appeal to the Court of Appeals from an intermediate appellate court is by
permission only, and requires a certificate granting leave to appeal, issued by either
“a judge of the court of appeals or . . . a justice of the appellate division of the
department which entered the order sought to be appealed.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 460.20(2)(a). The Court of Appeals may only review “question[s] of law” and is not
authorized to review issues reached by the intermediate appellate court “in the
interest of justice.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.20(1); see People v. Caban, 14
N.Y.3d 369, 373, 927 N.E.2d 1050, 1051, 901 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (2010) (“[A]n
Appellate Division reversal that is based on an unpreserved error is considered an
exercise of the Appellate Division's interest of justice power, not reviewable in [the
Court of Appeals].”).
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it is finally committed to them. Jurors are generally charged, in
such cases, to hold no conversations on the subject of the trial,
but in the long and dreary nights of their confinement a
compliance with such charge is very difficult.102

In addition to recognizing that sequestration can undermine
the integrity of the deliberative process, the Court of Appeals also
recognized that sequestration does little to ensure that the
integrity of the jury is not compromised. The court observed that
“[a]ttempts to bribe jurors would be very hazardous” and had
“little prospect of success.”103 Further, any attempt to tamper
with an unsequestered jury would usually be in favor of the
defendant because “[t]here have been but few, if any, attempts to
corrupt a juror in behalf of the prosecution.”104 The court also
noted that sequestration was an outmoded practice given “[t]he
great improvement in the character, intelligence and position of
jurors . . . .”105
Not every jurisdiction shared this view. In a case decided by
the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1812, during a “temporary
adjournment of the court, [a juror] went to the house at which he
boarded . . . [and] was absent 15 or 20 minutes.”106 Although
there was no evidence of juror tampering, the court reversed the
conviction and held that “keeping the jury together until they
agree without communication with others” is the only means by
which impartiality can be guaranteed.107 Committed to the

102

Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 554–55 (1859). Some intermediate appellate
courts, recognizing the coercive nature of sequestration have even reversed
convictions when juries were informed that they would be sequestered if they did not
reach a verdict. In People v. Nelson, an appellate court reversed a narcotics sale
conviction after the trial judge told the deadlocked jury that they were to return the
next morning for further deliberations and that they should come prepared for the
possibility of being sequestered overnight in the event they did not reach a verdict
by the end of the day. 30 A.D.3d 351, 352, 818 N.Y.S.2d 204, 204 (1st Dep’t 2006).
103
Stephens, 19 N.Y. at 555.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 556. Stephens dealt with an alleged sequestration violation which
occurred during the trial, as opposed to during deliberations. After each day, the
trial court, with the consent of the defendant, allowed the juror to return to their
homes for the evening and come back to court the following day. Id. at 553–55. The
Court of Appeals found that separation of a jury during the trial, without more, is an
insufficient basis to set aside a verdict. Id. at 568–69. However, the holding is
limited to a pre-deliberation separation of a jury with the consent of the defendant.
106
Commonwealth v. McCaul, 3 Va. Cas. 271, 303 (Va. 1812).
107
McCaul, 3 Va. Cas. at 302.
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necessity of this practice, the court held that it “will preserve
‘with fear and jealousy,’ and will not expose the trial by jury in
criminal cases, to such risque of contamination . . . .”108
The perceived value of mandatory sequestration thus began
to vary based upon jurisdiction, as did the remedy for violating it.
Although New York State seemed to recognize that mandatory
sequestration does little to ensure that a defendant receive a fair
trial, it remained an element of trials in New York State. In the
1881 codification of New York’s criminal procedure laws,109 § 421
of the Code of Criminal Procedure limited mandatory
sequestration to jury deliberations.110 Specifically, it provided:
After hearing the charge, the jury may either decide in court, or
may retire for deliberation. If they do not agree without
retiring, one or more officers must be sworn, to keep them
together in some private and convenient place, and not to
permit any person to speak to or communicate with them, nor
do so themselves, unless it be by order of the court, or to ask
them whether they have agreed upon a verdict, and to return
them into court when they have so agreed, or when ordered by
the court.111

Although sequestration during deliberations was still
mandatory, specific laws were enacted to expressly ensure that
jurors were not starved into agreement. Sections 423 and 424 of
the former Code of Criminal Procedure mandated that a

108

Id. at 305. The evolution of Virginia law on sequestration provides an
interesting contrast to that of New York. In the early 1800s, Virginia adopted a rule
requiring per se reversal of cases where a jury unnecessarily separated. Id. at 306.
That rule was in place until the late 1800s and was subsequently softened to create
a presumption of prejudice that the government had to refute. Owens v.
Commonwealth, 167 S.E. 377, 379 (Va. 1933). In 1922, Virginia made sequestration
discretionary in all but capital cases. See Robinson v. Virginia, 28 S.E.2d 10, 11 (Va.
1943), and it subsequently made it fully discretionary. VA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC.
19.2-264 (1950). See McFalls v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Va. 1967) (citing
Code of Va § 19.1-213 (1950)). By contrast, in the 1800s, New York did not mandate
per se reversal in cases of unnecessary jury separation. See infra note 205. Yet, it
was not until 2001 that sequestration became discretionary in New York. See infra
note 125 and accompanying text.
109
Act of June 1, 1881, ch. 442, 1881 N.Y. Laws 601 (enacting Code of Criminal
Procedure).
110
Sequestration before deliberations was authorized but not mandatory. See
former N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 414 (1881) (“The jurors sworn to try an
indictment may, at any time before the submission of the cause to the jury, in the
discretion of the court, be permitted to separate, or be kept in charge of proper
officers.”).
111
Former N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 421 (1881).
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deliberating jury be provided with “suitable furniture, fuel, lights
and stationery,” as well as “suitable and sufficient food and
lodging.”112
The rule mandating sequestration during deliberations was
preserved when the Code of Criminal Procedure was replaced
with the Criminal Procedure Law in 1971.113 Section 310.10,
which mandated sequestration during deliberations in all cases
until 1995, replaced § 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
However, following at least one unsuccessful attempt to amend
the law in 1987,114 in 1995 the Legislature relaxed the mandatory
sequestration requirement.
Primarily a cost saving
mechanism,115 CPL § 310.10(2) was created to permit a judge to
allow a jury to separate for up to 24 hours if the defendant was
not charged with a “class A felony or a class B violent felony
In so doing, the
offense or a class C violent felony.”116
accompanying bill memorandum stated that “New York [was] the
only State that mandates deliberating juries to be sequestered
from the time testimony ends until a verdict is reached.”117 The
Legislature also recognized that juries are frequently not
sequestered during the evidentiary phase of the trial, thus
undermining an argument that sequestration during
deliberations serves an important purpose.118

112
Other jurisdictions had rules which, on their face, continued the coercive
nature of sequestration. In a 1984 decision, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held
that the current statute “provides that jurors are to be kept together without food or
drink except water unless otherwise ordered by the court. This language is over a
hundred years old and is reminiscent of a time when jurors were the virtual
prisoners of court officers.” State v. Holly, 350 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. Ct.
1984). The court found this provision of the statute to be “punitive and inappropriate
and [directed that it] should be removed.” Id.
113
N.Y. Sess. Laws Chapter 996, 2147 (McKinney 2018).
114
STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST, LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING
COMMISSION, ALBANY NY (1987) at A512, A7506. The proposed 1987 amendment
would have eliminated mandatory sequestration of jurors in all cases except in class
A and B felony cases. This was a slightly more expansive amendment than the
version proposed and adopted in 1995.
115
There apparently was some opposition to eliminating mandatory
sequestration from the Court Officer’s Union given the effect it would have on
overtime. See Somini Sengupta, New Law Releases Juries in New York From
Sequestering, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/
31/nyregion/new-law-releases-juries-in-new-york-from-sequestering.html.
116
Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 83, 1995 N.Y. Laws 111–12.
117
Bill Memorandum, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 1995 A.B. 8063, 218th Leg. Reg. Sess.
(1995). This assertion was not correct. There are still six jurisdictions that mandate
sequestration during deliberations in all cases.
118
Id.
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Once the statute was amended, a survey was conducted to
evaluate the effects of the now authorized separations.119
Between July 5, 1995 and February 14, 1997, the Office of Court
Administration collected data from all criminal trials in which
the jury deliberated, regardless of whether the jury was
sequestered.120 Juries separated during deliberations in 688
cases and only one mistrial was granted for reasons relating to
the jury’s separation during deliberations.121 Further, there was
no appreciable difference between the time a separated jury
deliberated and the time a sequestered jury deliberated.122 The
study ultimately concluded that the “experiment permitting
deliberating juries in criminal trials to separate [had] been
successful.”123 Jurors no longer had to bear the burden of
sequestration, and “[t]he predicted negative impact—more
mistrials and increased costs—simply did not occur.”124
Accordingly, in 2001, the statute was amended to its current
form, authorizing judges to permit juries to separate in all
criminal cases at the close of court on one day, and resume
deliberations on the next day that the courts are open for
business.125 Although the “24-hour rule” is an improvement over
past practices, it deprives judges of much-needed flexibility in
dealing with unpredictable instances of juror unavailability.
IV. CASE LAW INTERPRETING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
§ 310.10(2)
The limited case law arising from claimed violations of the
“24-hour rule” in CPL § 310.10(2) has not clarified whether and
under what circumstances a defendant is entitled to a mistrial
without the need to show prejudice if deliberations do not resume
within the statutory time period. Trial judges are therefore
understandably hesitant to deviate from the statutory mandate

119
The report was mandated by the Legislature. At the same time that CPL §
310.10(2) was enacted, the Legislature enacted CPL § 310.10(3). See Act of June 20,
1995, ch. 83, 1995 N.Y. Laws 111–12. That section provided that “[t]he chief
administrator of the office of court administration shall prepare a report on the
number of cases where the court separated the jury pursuant to this section.”
120
HON. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, SEPARATION AND SEQUESTRATION OF
DELIBERATING JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 5 (1999).
121
Id. at 5–6.
122
See generally id.
123
Id. at 16.
124
Id.
125
Act of May 30, 2001, ch. 47, 2001 N.Y. Laws 102.
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and adjourn deliberations, even in cases of necessity, or to deny
motions for mistrial when there is a recess in deliberations in
excess of the 24-hour period.
A violation of CPL § 310.10(2), if viewed as a “mode of
proceeding” error, would require an automatic mistrial or
reversal on appeal. A mode of proceeding error is a doctrine
unique to New York that is best described as “an umbrella term
for a loose grouping of various process-oriented errors,” usually
occurring during the course of the trial.126 These types of errors
are said to undermine “the essential validity of the process and
are so fundamental that the entire trial is irreparably tainted
[when a mode of proceeding error occurs].”127
The mode of proceeding doctrine has its origins in an 1858
decision of the Court of Appeals—Cancemi v. People.128 In that
case, one of the jurors was discharged and, with the consent of
the defendant, the murder trial proceeded with, and the verdict
was rendered by, only eleven jurors.129 At the time, New York
had no provision for a defendant to waive a jury in a felony
prosecution; it was not until 1938 that the State Constitution
was amended to permit a defendant to waive his jury rights in all
non-capital cases.130 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that
the defendant’s waiver of a twelve-person jury was invalid and it
reversed his conviction, reasoning as follows:
[T]he right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to affect, by
consent, the conduct of the case [is] much more limited than in
civil actions. It should not be permitted to extend so far as to
work radical changes in great and leading provisions as to the
organization of the tribunals or the mode of proceeding
prescribed by the constitution and the laws.131

The Court of Appeals further explained the mode of
proceeding doctrine in People v. Patterson, when it rejected a
claim requiring a murder defendant to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional

126

Gary Muldoon, Understanding New York’s “Mode of Proceeding” Muddle, 59
BUFFALO L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2011).
127
People v. Kelly, 5 N.Y.3d 116, 119, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181, 799 N.Y.S.2d 763,
765 (2005).
128
18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
129
Id. at 131.
130
People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 443–44, 880 N.E.2d 863, 866, 850 N.Y.S.2d
377, 380 (2007).
131
Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137.
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disturbance and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof.132
Although the court held that the defendant’s due process rights
were protected by the prosecution’s initial burden of having to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt his intent to kill his victim, it
nevertheless acknowledged that in certain instances, not present
in the case before it, a trial error “that . . . affect[s] the
organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed
by law,” would result in reversal even without preservation of the
error at trial.133 The purpose of the doctrine, the court stated, “is
to ensure that criminal trials are conducted in accordance with
the mode of procedure mandated by Constitution and statute.
Where the procedure adopted by the court below is at a basic
variance with the mandate of law, the entire trial is irreparably
tainted.”134 The court further explained that “where the court
had no jurisdiction, or where the right to trial by jury was
disregarded, or where there was a fundamental, nonwaivable
defect in the mode of procedure, then an appellate court must
reverse, even though the question was not formally raised
below.”135
As the doctrine has developed, it has become more difficult to
understand and therefore predict which procedural errors fall
under the mode of proceeding umbrella because “[w]ith each area
that the Court of Appeals has found a mode [of proceeding]
violation, the court has seemingly found the need to emphasize
the narrowness of the issue, and often to deny its application in a
later case.”136
Some errors that have been classified as
implicating the mode of proceeding doctrine include a trial
judge’s failure to preside over portions of the trial by delegating
responsibility to a law secretary,137 failing to disclose to the
defense the full contents of a jury note before responding to it,138
violating a defendant’s right to be present at material stages of
the proceeding,139 and the conviction of a nonexistent crime.140
132
39 N.Y.2d 288, 301, 347 N.E.2d 898, 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976), aff’d,
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
133
Id. at 295, 347 N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
134
Id. at 295–96, 347 N.E.2d at 932, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577–78.
135
Id., 347 N.E.2d at 932, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577–78.
136
Muldoon, supra note 126, at 1206.
137
People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984,
985 (1985).
138
People v. O’Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 279, 579 N.E.2d 189, 193, 574 N.Y.S.2d
159, 163 (1991).
139
People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 827, 832, 18 N.E.3d 367, 370, 993 N.Y.S.2d 656,
659 (2017).
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Designating a procedural error as a “mode of proceeding”
error has significant ramifications—the most important of which
is that it results in reversal of a conviction without any
consideration of the prejudice that the error may have caused.141
Prejudice will be presumed when a mode of proceeding error
occurs and there is no opportunity for the prosecution to rebut
that presumption.142 Additionally, mode of proceeding errors
cannot be waived or consented to by a defendant.143 For example,
in People v. Ahmed, the trial judge’s law secretary responded to
several jury notes, which included a request for a rereading of
the instructions on reasonable doubt.144 Notwithstanding the
defendant’s consent, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
and held that “the absence of the trial judge, and the delegation
of some of his duties to his law secretary . . . deprived the
defendant of his right to a trial by jury, an integral component of
which is the supervision of a judge.”145
As shown by the Patterson case, in addition to being nonwaivable, mode of proceeding errors can also be reviewed by an
appellate court even though the complained of error was not
preserved by a proper objection.146 Under New York law, in order
to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must object and
state with specificity the reasons why the complained of ruling
was error.147 If the ruling is not corrected after the objection, the
issue is deemed preserved for appellate review. Generally,
alleged errors which are unpreserved can only be reviewed on

140
People v. Martinez, 81 N.Y.2d 810, 812, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278, 595 N.Y.S.2d
376, 377 (1993).
141
People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 540, 55 N.E.3d. 1041, 1046, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68,
73 (2016) (holding that “[m]ode of proceedings errors are immune not only from the
rules governing preservation and waiver but also from harmless error analysis”).
142
Id., 55 N.E.3d. at 1046, 36 N.Y.S.3d at 73.
143
People v. Becoats, 17 N.Y.3d 643, 650, 958 N.E.2d 865, 867, 934 N.Y.S.2d
737, 739 (2011) (“A defendant in a criminal case cannot waive, or even consent to,
error that would affect the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings
pr[e]scribed by law”) (quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 294, 347 N.E.2d
898, 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (1976)); see also Mack, 27 N.Y.3d at 539, 55 N.E.3d
at 1046, 36 N.Y.S.3d at 73; rehearing denied, 28 N.Y.3d 944, 60 N.E.3d 407, 38
N.Y.S.3d 513 (Mem) (2016).
144
People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 309, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984,
985 (1985).
145
Id., 487 N.E.2d at 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 132–135.
147
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.05(2) (McKinney 2018).
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appeal under limited circumstances, such as when an
intermediate appellate court, in the exercise of its discretion,
reviews a claim “in the interest of justice.”148
Apart from interest of justice jurisdiction, mode of
proceeding errors are another exception to the preservation rule
and can be reviewed by both intermediate appellate courts and
the Court of Appeals in the absence of a timely objection.149
Thus, if an alleged error is classified as a mode of proceeding
error, then the Court of Appeals is empowered to review it even if
the issue was not preserved in the trial court.150
Although the Court of Appeals has not ruled on whether a
violation of CPL § 310.10(2) is a mode of proceeding error, it
temporarily classified a violation of the earlier, mandatory
sequestration requirement as a mode of proceeding error,
requiring automatic reversal. In People v. Coons, deliberating
jurors were permitted to “go to their homes for dinner, separately
and unsupervised.”151 At the time of the trial, CPL § 310.10(2)
had not yet been enacted and, accordingly, judges were required
Although the
to sequester juries during deliberations.152
defendant in Coons did not object to the separation of the
deliberating jurors, the Court of Appeals classified the violation
as a mode of proceeding error, reversed the conviction, and held

148
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.15(3)(c). The basis of a discretionary reversal of a
judgment in the “interest of justice” includes, but is not limited to, a determination
that an “error or defect . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” N.Y. CRIM. PRO.
LAW § 470.15(6)(a). “Interest of justice” jurisdiction is conferred solely on
intermediate appellate courts; the Court of Appeals is exclusively a court of law.
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.20(6); People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492 n.1, 900
N.E.2d 946, 950 n.1, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399 n.1 (2008).
149
The authority of the Court of Appeals to review unpreserved “mode of
proceeding” errors is derived from CPL § 470.35(1), which provides that the Court of
Appeals may consider “any question of law involving alleged error or defect in the
criminal court proceedings resulting in the original criminal court
judgment, . . . regardless of whether such question was raised” in the intermediate
appellate court. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.35(1). A mode of proceeding error is
classified as a “question of law.” People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 296, 347 N.E.2d
898, 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (1976).
150
Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 296, 347 N.E.2d at 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
151
People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 797, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94,
95 (1990).
152
The requirement that jurors be “continuously kept together” during
deliberations remains in effect, as provided in CPL § 310.10(1). N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW
§ 310.10(1). However, based on the phrase, “except as otherwise provided by
subdivision two of this section,” the trial court has discretion to permit the jurors to
return home each evening so long as the “24-hour rule” in CPL § 310.10(2) is
observed. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 310.10(2).
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that “[e]rrors which ‘affect the organization of the court or the
mode of proceedings prescribed by law’ need not be preserved
and, even if acceded to, still present a question of law for this
court to review.”153
Less than two years later, in People v. Webb,154 the Court of
Appeals was faced with another case that involved the separation
of a jury in violation of the mandatory sequestration rule.
However, unlike in Coons, the defendant in Webb, in the
presence of his counsel, expressly consented, on the record, to the
proposed separation of the jury during deliberations.155 The issue
in Webb was whether the mandatory sequestration rule could be
waived given the recent mode of proceeding classification in
Coons.156
The court, citing Coons, rejected the defendant’s attempt to
equate an error that is “sufficiently linked to the mode of
proceedings so as not to require preservation,” with an error
“which necessarily entails a part of the process so essential to the
form and conduct of the actual trial that the defendant may not
waive it.”157 The court found the defendant’s reasoning—“what
need not be preserved may not be waived”—to be fatally flawed,
and held that “the sequestration provision does not implicate
fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial itself.”158
Moreover, the court noted, the “requirement that a deliberating
jury be sequestered is entirely statutory and reflects no
established common-law right of the defendant.”159 But, most
importantly, the court reasoned:
The protection which the provision affords a defendant does not
relate to the actual trial proceeding or to how, by what proof or
by whom a defendant may be tried and adjudged guilty. Rather
CPL 310.10 relates to what happens after completion of the trial
proper and simply prescribes the separate place, outside the
courtroom, the supervisory personnel and interdiction against
anyone speaking to or being permitted to speak to any of the

153

Coons, 75 N.Y.2d at 797, 551 N.E.2d at 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (internal
citations omitted).
154
People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, 336, 581 N.E.2d 509, 509, 575 N.Y.S.2d 656,
656 (1991).
155
Id. at 336–37, 581 N.E.2d at 509–10, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656–57.
156
Id., 581 N.E.2d at 509–10, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656–57.
157
Id. at 337–38, 581 N.E.2d at 510–11, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657–58.
158
Id. at 338, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
159
Id., 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
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jurors. Thus, we conclude that the sequestration requirement
does not entail a right of defendant that is so essential to the
trial proceeding that it may never be waived.160

Significantly, the court noted that the “ancient common-law
practice of keeping the jurors locked up without food or drink,
and sometimes without heat and light, until they reached a
verdict was simply to force them to agree,” as opposed “to
protect[ing] the defendant by keeping the deliberating jurors from
being improperly influenced by contacts with or communications
from outside sources . . . .”161
By holding that a defendant can waive the sequestration
requirement, the Court of Appeals implicitly removed the mode
of proceeding classification. Indeed, not only are mode of
proceeding errors exempt from the preservation requirement,
they “are not waivable and therefore require reversal even if the
defense affirmatively consents to the court’s action.”162 Further,
the court in Coons had specifically held that mode of proceeding
errors still present “a question of law for this court to review”
even “if acceded to.”163 Thus, the holding in Webb was completely
at odds with the holding in Coons.
That Webb effectively overruled Coons was made clear by the
Court of Appeals in People v. Agramonte, a consolidated appeal of
two separate cases decided when sequestration was still
mandatory.164
In each case, the deliberating jurors were
permitted to dine with the alternate jurors in violation of both
CPL § 310.10 and CPL § 270.30(1).165 No objection was raised by
the defendant in either case before the jurors and alternates were
sent to dinner together.166 The court acknowledged that in
Coons, it had concluded that a violation of the mandatory
sequestration rule was a “mode of proceedings error,” but
160
Id., 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
161
Id. at 340 n.*, 581 N.E.2d at 511 n.*, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658 n.* (emphasis in
original).
162
People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 543, 55 N.E.3d. 1041, 1049, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68,
76 (2016).
163
People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 797, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94,
95 (1990).
164
People v. Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 767, 665 N.E.2d 164, 165, 642 N.Y.S.2d
594, 595 (1996).
165
CPL § 270.30(1) requires that “[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the
court must . . . direct the alternate jurors not to discuss the case and . . . be kept
separate and apart from the regular jurors.”
166
See Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d at 770, 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
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admitted that it had done so “without discussion of the
underlying requirement.”167 The court relied exclusively on its
reasoning in Webb, noting that in that case it had “clarified” that
“the sequestration requirement does not ‘entail[] a part of the
process essential to the form and conduct of the actual trial’ [nor
does it] . . . ‘implicate fundamental rights that are an integral
part of the trial itself.’ ”168 Reaffirming the viability of Webb over
Coons, the court added: “Webb makes plain that the failure to
sequester the deliberating jurors does not constitute a
fundamental deviation from the proper mode of judicial
proceedings,” and “do[es] not fall within the ‘one very narrow
exception to the requirement of a timely objection.’ ”169
The Court of Appeals’ brief classification of a sequestration
violation as a mode of proceeding error is difficult to understand.
While the court on other occasions has removed the “mode of
proceeding” classification from certain types of error, the brevity
with which this occurred in the context of jury sequestration is
unusual.170 The decision in Coons is even more perplexing since
the court denied leave to appeal in at least one pre-Coons case
where a defendant waived the sequestration requirement. In
People v. Silvernail, the jury was not sequestered with the
consent of the defendant.171 The conviction was affirmed by the
intermediate appellate court, finding that a jury can be properly
separated during deliberations, with the consent of the
defendant.172 A judge of the Court of Appeals subsequently
denied leave to appeal.173 In 1982, the Chief Administrative
Judge of New York State stated that “there is no basis in
constitutional mandate, logic or experience which should compel
our continued blind adherence to a system in which deliberating
jurors in all criminal cases are held in a virtual state of
167

Id., 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
Id., 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (emphasis in original).
169
Id., 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (emphasis in original) (quoting
People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577
(1976)).
170
Waiving a twelve-person jury was “declassified” as a mode of proceeding
error after the State Constitution was amended to permit a defendant to waive a
jury trial in a felony case. Compare Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 129 (1858) with
People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 448, 880 N.E.2d 863, 870, 850 N.Y.S.2d 377, 384
(2007).
171
People v. Silvernail, 55 A.D.2d 72, 75, 389 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (3d Dep’t 1976).
172
Id. at 75–76, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 643–44.
173
People v. Silvernail, 41 N.Y.2d 869, 362 N.E.2d 635, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1037
(Table) (1977).
168
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imprisonment until their verdicts are rendered.”174 Further, in
2001, when the current version of CPL § 310.10(2) was enacted,
the late Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye, who joined in
the Coons decision, celebrated the end of mandatory
sequestration—noting that “[t]here’s no need to truck [jurors] out
to hotels, separate them from their lives and their families in
every case.”175
A possible explanation for the court’s decision to briefly
classify a sequestration violation as a mode of proceeding error is
that the court may have inadvertently conflated the different
types of sequestration violations. The statute, as it existed when
Coons was decided, had three separate mandates: (1) keeping the
jury together at all times after deliberations begin;
(2) prohibiting other individuals from speaking with the jury,
except by order of the court; and (3) prohibiting anyone but
deliberating jurors from entering the jury room.176
In classifying a sequestration violation as a mode of
proceeding error, the court in Coons cited to People v. Bouton, an
appeal from convictions for sexual abuse and related offenses
that involved a violation of CPL § 310.10 different from that
which occurred in Coons.177 On the morning of the day the
verdict was announced, a court clerk inadvertently delivered to
the jury items that had never been admitted into evidence.178
These items included two versions of defendant’s confessions
from which a reference to uncharged sexual activity had not been
redacted.179 The same clerk, after realizing that prohibited
material had been delivered to the jury, made an unauthorized
entry into the jury room to retrieve the unadmitted evidence.180
In reversing the convictions, the court noted, while citing to CPL
§ 310.10, “[t]he strong public policy favoring the absolute
confidentiality of jury deliberations,” and the prohibition against
174

Evans, Mandatory Jury Sequestration Deemed Archaic by Administrative
Judge, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1982, at 25, col. 4, at 32, col. 4.
175
Somini Sengupta, New Law Releases Juries in New York From Sequestering,
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/31/nyregion/new-lawreleases-juries-in-new-york-from-sequestering.html.
176
The second and third mandates remain under the current statute. The first
is subject to the “24-hour rule” of CPL § 310.10(2).
177
People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 797, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94,
95 (1990) (citing People v. Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d 130, 138, 405 N.E.2d 699, 703, 428
N.Y.S.2d 218, 222 (1980)).
178
Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d at 136–37, 405 N.E.2d at 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
179
Id., 405 N.E.2d at 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
180
Id., 405 N.E.2d at 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
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dealing with “so-called ‘emergencies’ ” by anyone other than the
trial court except “in the rarest and most inescapable of
circumstances.”181
The entry of the clerk into the jury room, an event that the
Court of Appeals strongly condemned, indeed violated CPL §
310.10. That is a serious departure from proper procedure which
could, and likely did, have an impact of the defendant’s right to a
fair trial. Such an occurrence is a far cry from a brief separation
of jurors during deliberations, which is a pure statutory violation
that does not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights or
expose the jury to tampering or improper influence.182 The
court’s reliance on Coons in Bouton was thus inappropriate and
conflated two very different types of CPL § 310.10 violations.
Whatever the reason for the holding in Coons, it is over
twenty-five years old and was implicitly overruled in Webb.183
Further, since the Court of Appeals decided Agramonte, Coons
has never been cited for the proposition that the failure to
sequester a deliberating jury is a non-waivable, fundamental
defect in the trial.184 It should therefore have no bearing on the
proper remedy for a violation of the 24-hour rule of CPL §
310.10(2) and, indeed, the lower appellate courts have thus far
declined to classify violations of CPL § 310.10(2) as mode of
proceeding errors. For example, in People v. Encarnacion-Cross,
the defendant was indicted and tried for possession of felony
weight narcotics.185 Prior to jury selection, the judge announced
that the trial would not be in session on Wednesday because that
was the judge’s conference day.186 The intermediate appellate
court held that “[d]efendant did not preserve his claims regarding
181

Id. at 138, 405 N.E.2d at 703, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
See People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, 339–40, 581 N.E.2d 509, 511, 575
N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (1991).
183
Id., 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
184
The intermediate appellate courts that have cited Coons addressed issues
similar to the claimed intrusion into deliberations that occurred in Bouton, rather
than a failure to sequester a jury. See, e.g., People v. McKay, 214 A.D.2d 685, 686,
625 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590 (2d Dep’t 1995) (finding reversible error in allowing a clerk to
respond to a jury’s substantive legal question); People v. Lara, 199 A.D.2d 419, 419–
20, 605 N.Y.S.2d 339, 339 (2d Dep’t 1993) (finding mode of proceeding error when
court sent message, through non-judicial staff member, that jury had to continue
deliberating); People v. Boyd, 166 A.D.2d 659, 659, 561 N.Y.S.2d 257, 257 (2d Dep’t
1990) (instructing a court officer “to go into the jury room and tell the [deadlocked]
jury to continue deliberating” constituted a mode of proceeding error).
185
132 A.D.3d 422, 423, 17 N.Y.S.3d 291, 291 (1st Dep’t 2015).
186
Transcript of Record at 18–21, People v. Encarnacion-Cross, No. 685/2013, at
12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Oct. 10, 2013).
182
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events that transpired during jury deliberations, and there were
no mode of proceeding errors exempt from preservation
requirements.”187
Because a violation of CPL § 310.10(2) is not a mode of
proceeding error, the 24-hour rule can be waived by the
defendant, although there is no requirement that the defendant
personally waive the restriction.188 Waiver can be established by
the defendant’s consent to extend a recess for a specific period.
Waiver can also be established by a defendant’s failure to
clearly and timely object to a recess which is in excess of the 24hour period. In People v. Garcia, jury deliberations began on a
Monday.189 On Friday, two jurors failed to appear, one because of
illness and another (“juror number two”) due to an assault on her
child that resulted in hospitalization.190 The defense moved for a
mistrial arguing that the condition of juror number two’s child
rendered the mother “ ‘grossly unqualified’ because she would not
be able to concentrate on the case when she returned.”191
On Monday, both jurors returned, but before deliberations
resumed, the trial judge questioned juror number two and
concluded that she remained qualified.192 Defendant then moved
for a mistrial on the previously unstated ground that jury
deliberations had been suspended for more than 24 hours, in
violation of CPL § 310.10(2), but the court denied the motion as

187
Encarnacion-Cross, 132 A.D.3d at 423, 17 N.Y.S.3d at 291 (citing People v.
Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 770, 665 N.E.2d 164, 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (1996)).
The application of Encarnacion-Cross to CPL § 310.10(2) is not readily apparent
from the appellate court’s opinion. The court uses the phrase “events that transpired
during jury deliberations,” but does not expressly state that the claim of error
relates to the length of a mid-deliberation recess.
188
People v. Bello, 82 N.Y.2d 862, 863, 631 N.E.2d 104, 104, 609 N.Y.S.2d 162,
162 (1993) (rejecting the argument that waiver of mandatory sequestration must be
“made by the accused personally, and that his attorney's waiver on the record was
insufficient”); see also In re Daniel Capellan v. Stone et al., 49 A.D.3d 121, 125, 849
N.Y.S.2d 530, 533 (1st Dep’t 2008) (“The court's conclusion that the statute
precludes a waiver of continuous deliberations is contrary to the decisional law
interpreting both the predecessor statute of CPL § 310.10 and the statute as
presently enacted.”).
189
24 A.D.3d 308, 308, 808 N.Y.S.2d 34, 34 (1st Dep’t 2005), leave to appeal
denied, 6 N.Y.3d 833, 847 N.E.2d 378, 814 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Table) (2006).
190
The specific details of the jury issue were described in the subsequent habeas
corpus petition. See Garcia v. Burge, 2008 WL 627508 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008)
(report of magistrate judge), adopted by Garcia v Burge, 2009 WL 102142 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 15, 2009).
191
Garcia, 2008 WL 627508 at *4.
192
Id.
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untimely.193 In affirming the conviction, the appellate court
found that “[t]he record establishes that defendant waived his
present contention that the court improperly suspended
deliberations of the nonsequestered jury for more than the
statutorily mandated period of 24 hours.”194
Waiver can also be established by a defendant’s consent,
obtained before the trial begins, to take a certain day of the week
off during the trial. This agreement will carry through to the
deliberation phase and relieve the trial court of any statutory
obligation to have the jury deliberate during that particular day
of the week. In People v. Mullings, defendant argued that his
conviction should be reversed based upon a violation of the
mandate of CPL § 310.10(2).195 The trial, which began in
January 2012, lasted over six months. Prior to the start of the
trial, the court approved a request by the defense to not convene
on Fridays.196 During deliberations, on Thursday, July 19, 2012,
with no verdict having been reached, two jurors had unexpected
developments that made their continued presence on Friday and
the following Monday extremely difficult.197 One juror’s oldest
daughter, who babysat for a younger sibling, needed tonsil
surgery.198 The only person who could care for the younger child
was the juror’s sister, who was unavailable until 5:00 p.m. on
Monday.199 A second juror’s brother had been recently murdered
and the juror was scheduled to travel to Mississippi for a
memorial service.200 Without sufficient funds for a last-minute
airline trip, the juror planned to drive, which would take him 22
hours each way, thus making him unavailable to deliberate until
5:00 p.m. on Monday.201

193

Id.
Garcia, 24 A.D.3d at 309, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
195
146 A.D.3d 816, 817, 44 N.Y.S.3d 550, 551 (2d Dep’t 2017), leave to appeal
denied, 29 N.Y.3d 1084 (2017).
196
Brief for Respondent at 24, People v. Mullings, 146 A.D.3d 816, 44 N.Y.S.3d
550 (2d Dep’t 2017) (No. 10-1502) (“On January 3, 2012, [defendant] suggested to the
court that it ‘might want to consider not working on Fridays.’ The court responded,
‘yes we will take Fridays off’ [T-66-67].”).
197
Transcript of Record at 8501–03, People v. Mullings, No. 1502N/2010 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau Co. July 18, 2012).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 8510–12 (July 19, 2012).
201
Id. at 8511.
194
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Although the defense had requested that the trial be in
recess on Fridays, counsel insisted on strict compliance with CPL
§ 310.10(2) after learning of the jurors’ unavailability.202 Not
surprisingly, the appellate court rejected the argument, holding
that “[t]he defendant waived his contention that the Supreme
Court violated the continuous deliberation rule set forth in CPL §
310.10.”203
These cases confirm that violations of CPL § 310.10(2) are
not mode of proceeding errors and are thus subject to rules
governing waiver, preservation, and harmless error.204 However,
no case has thus far found a violation of the statute or opined on
the appropriate remedy in the event of one.
Confining CPL § 310.10(2) violations to non-emergency,
planned separations, and requiring a mistrial or reversal only
when a defendant is prejudiced, would be consistent with
longstanding common law principles pre-dating the enactment of
the Code of Criminal Procedure,205 and with case law interpreting
202
203

Id.
People v. Mullings, 146 A.D.3d 816, 817, 44 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (2d Dep’t

2017).
204
Under New York Law, a mistrial is warranted after the occurrence of “an
error or legal defect in the proceedings, . . . which is prejudicial to the defendant and
deprives him of a fair trial.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10(1) (McKinney 2018).
Thus, a defendant who moves for a mistrial under this theory would be required to
show prejudice. A mistrial is also warranted when a circumstance arises which
makes it “physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law.”
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10(3). Mistrials under this section typically occur in
extreme circumstances such as “when the judge or other essential court personnel
are unavailable due to death or serious illness.” In re Marcus B, 95 A.D.3d 15, 19,
942 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41 (1st Dep’t 2012). A mistrial under this section would also be
warranted when a deliberating juror is appropriately discharged and there are no
available alternate jurors, People v. Mason, 233 A.D.2d 271, 272, 600 N.Y.S.2d 131,
132 (1st Dep’t 1996), when a disaster occurs that prevents the trial from continuing,
People v. Perez, 15 A.D.3d 165, 166, 708 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (1st Dep’t 2005), when
defense counsel is disqualified, In re Vilair Fonvil v. Molea, 299 A.D.2d 550, 550–51,
750 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (2d Dep’t 2002), or in the event of a defense attorney’s
suspension from the practice of law. People v. Anderson, 186 A.D.2d 140, 140, 587
N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (2d Dep’t 1992). These events either physically prevent the trial
from continuing, or implicate a fundamental right of the defendant. A brief and
unexpected interruption of jury deliberations can hardly be equated with a disaster
which renders the courthouse inaccessible for the near future, or the incapacity of
either the defendant’s attorney or the presiding judge.
205
In 1825, in People v. Douglass, two jurors separated from the deliberating
jurors in order eat and drink “spirituous liquor,” and while doing so, they “conversed
on the subject of the trial.” 4 Cow. 26, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1825). The court, noting the near
unanimous rule that an improper separation of a jury, which did not prejudice the
defendant, was not a sufficient basis for a mistrial or to set aside the verdict, found
such prejudice under the facts of the case. Id. at 36. A slightly stricter approach was
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violations of the mandatory sequestration provision in § 421 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure206 and its successor provision,
CPL § 310.10 prior to the enactment of subsection (2).207 With
the exception of the brief period between the Court of Appeals’
decisions in Coons and Webb, cases applying the mandatory
sequestration provisions required defendants to demonstrate
prejudice when seeking a reversal or moving for a mistrial based
on an improper separation of the jury. Moreover, separation of a
deliberating jury in cases of necessity has never been viewed as a

taken in Eastwood v. People, an 1855 murder case where approximately six jurors,
without permission, separated from the rest of the jury and went to examine the
murder scene. 3 Park. Cr. R. 25 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1955). The court noted that the
“early doctrines of the common law in regard to the misconduct of jurors have been
greatly modified in more modern times . . . . [A]fter . . . the trial commenced, they
could not . . . be permitted to separate, except in cases of evident necessity, and that
any unauthorized separation would be fatal to the verdict.” Id. at 41. The court
concluded that a separation of a jury in a capital case would be grounds for a
mistrial “unless . . . it is affirmatively shown on the part of the
prosecution, . . . [beyond a reasonable doubt], that no injury could have resulted to
the prisoner from the separation, the verdict will not be set aside.” Id. at 45.
Nonetheless, even under this stricter approach, there was still no requirement of per
se reversal. Id.
206
In People v. Dunbar Contracting Co., the trial court permitted, during
deliberations, “[s]ix jurors were taken to dine at one hotel, and six at another.” 215
N.Y. 416, 416, 109 N.E. 554, 554 (1915). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
“[d]uring prolonged deliberations, some degree of separation is often inevitable,” and
noting that “[t]here are times and emergencies when the statute contemplates that
leave of the court will justify a separation of jurors.” Id., 109 N.E. at 554. Even if the
separation were improper, it would be not be a ground for reversal because the
defendant suffered no prejudice. Id., 109 N.E. at 554 (“But even if the separation
were to be thought an irregularity, no prejudice resulted.”). Similarly, in People v.
Hoch, a juror became ill during trial and required a full day of medical treatment.
150 N.Y. 291, 302, 44 N.E. 976, 980 (1896). Although a court officer was constantly
with the juror during his absence, the separation was still, on its face, in violation of
the sequestration statute. In declining to order a new trial, the Court of Appeals
noted that “there was nothing in the incident, which could have prejudiced the
defendant.” Id., 44 N.E. at 980.
207
In People v. Fernandez, the trial court permitted “at least one juror to attend
church services, during a lunch recess, [allegedly] unsupervised.” 183 A.D.2d 605,
606, 586 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (1st Dep’t 1992), aff'd, 81 N.Y.2d 1023, 616 N.E.2d 497,
599 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1993). In affirming the conviction, the intermediate appellate
court opined: “During prolonged deliberations, some degree of separation is often
inevitable. The trial court must determine to what extent it shall be allowed. We
hold, therefore, that the division of the jurors did not infringe the defendants’ rights.
But even if the separation were to be thought an irregularity, no prejudice resulted.”
Id. at 606, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 247. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no reason to
construe CPL § 310.10 differently from former Code of Criminal Procedure § 421.
People v. Fernandez, 81 N.Y.2d 1023, 1024, 616 N.E.2d 497, 498, 599 N.Y.S.2d 911,
912 (1993) (finding “no legislative intent to overrule our construction of the prior
statute [that] has been called to our attention”).
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violation of the mandatory sequestration provision requiring per
se reversal. Accordingly, because a defendant was required to
demonstrate prejudice when sequestration was mandatory, he
should have to do the same, if not more, when alleging a violation
of CPL § 310.10(2). And because separation in cases of necessity
was not deemed to be a violation of the mandatory sequestration
rule, it should not be considered a violation of the less restrictive
limitation on recesses.
At least one trial judge has expressly followed this approach
under CPL § 310.10(2), holding that the statute is not violated
when deliberations do not resume within the statutory period
because of the unforeseen absence of a juror due to illness or
other exigency. In People v. Taylor, a juror was temporarily
hospitalized during deliberations.208 The following day, the juror
contacted the court and stated that “he was anxious to return to
continue deliberations.”209 Although there was no articulable
prejudice to the defendant, the defense moved for a mistrial,
arguing that the juror’s one day absence violated CPL §
310.10(2).210 The trial judge denied the application, holding that
the restrictions of CPL § 310.10(2) were only meant to limit
planned adjournments, “not to require a mistrial when an
unavoidable event or other emergency occurs.”211 However, the
defendant was ultimately acquitted and thus no appellate court
had the opportunity to review the trial judge’s analysis.212
Accordingly, Taylor does not provide any binding authority that
judges may rely on when, in cases of necessity, one or more
deliberating jurors is temporarily unable to return to court to
resume deliberations within the time period specified in CPL §
310.10(2).
V. NO OTHER STATE HAS A PER SE RULE REQUIRING REVERSAL
FOR UNPLANNED BUT NECESSARY SEPARATION OF JURORS
DURING DELIBERATIONS
The perceived value of jury sequestration varies widely
thorough the country. Some jurisdictions prohibit it except in the
most exceptional cases.
These states take the view that
sequestration causes prejudice to a defendant’s rights because
208
209
210
211
212

People v. Taylor, 32 Misc. 3d 546, 548, 926 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
Id., N.Y.S.2d at 817.
Id., N.Y.S.2d at 817.
Id. at 554, N.Y.S.2d at 821.
Id., N.Y.S.2d at 821.
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the fear of being sequestered can coerce a jury to rush to verdict
without adequate deliberation.
Other states consider
sequestration an essential tool to ensure a defendant a fair trial.
Common to almost all of these jurisdictions is the rule that
separation of a jury, in violation of a statutorily mandated
requirement for sequestration, is not grounds for a mistrial,
especially in cases of emergency.
There are currently twenty-seven states, as well as the
District of Columbia, that leave the decision to sequester a jury
entirely to the discretion of the trial judge.213 These states have
no statutory restriction on the length of a separation of a jury at
any phase of the trial. A trial judge’s decision not to sequester a
jury, or even in some cases to order sequestration over the
defendant’s objection, is reviewable solely for an abuse of
discretion.214 Eight additional states leave separation to the

213

ALA R. CRIM. P. 19.3(a)(1)(1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-125(d)(1) (2017);
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 27 (e)(2) (2017); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 19.4 (2017); CAL PENAL CODE
§1121 (2018); COLO. CRIM. P. R. 24(f)(2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-246 (2018); D.C.
SUP. CT. R. CRIM. P., 36-I (2017) (“The judge . . . may sequester the jury, or may take
such other approved procedures as seem necessary to insure a fair trial in the
case.”); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1214 (D.C. 1988) (“The decision to
sequester a jury lies within the discretion of the trial judge.”); Claudio v. State, 585
A.2d 1278, 1301 n.58 (Del. 1991) (“Delaware has adopted various rules and
procedures which recognized the trial judge's discretionary right at common law to
permit the jurors to eat and even to separate during the course of their
deliberations.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-32 (2017); ME. R. UNIF. CRIM. P. 24(e) (2017);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 8-422 (2018); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 20(e)(3) (2018); MICH. CODE
CRIM. P. § 768.16 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-501(1) (2017); State v. Smart,
622 A.2d 1197, 1209 (N.H. 1993) (“Sequestration is an extreme measure, one of the
most burdensome tools of the many available to assure a fair trial. Furthermore, the
decision to grant a motion to sequester the jury is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and is not required simply because of media attention”) (internal
citations omitted); State v. Martinez, 658 P.2d 428, 432 (N.M. 1983); State v. Griffin,
866 P.2d 1156, 1162 (N.M. 1993) (refusal of court to sequester jury was not abuse of
discretion); N.J., CT R. 1:8-6(b) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-1236(b) (2017); OR. R.
CIV. P., 59(C)(6) (2018) (permitting a trial judge to “allow the jury to separate during
its deliberations when the court is of the opinion that the deliberation process will
not be adversely affected.”); see also, OR. REV. STAT. § 136.330(1) (2018) (making
Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 59[C] applicable to criminal cases); PA. R. CRIM. P.
642(A) (2018); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-13 (2017); UTAH CODE CRIM. P. 77-17-9(1)
(2017); VT. R. CRIM. P. 23(d) (2018); VA. CODE CRIM. P. 19.2-264 (2018); WA. SUPR.
CT. CRIM. R. 6.7 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-6 (2018); WIS. STAT. 972.12 (2017).
214
See, e.g., Lam Luong v. State, 199 So. 3d 173, 188–89 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)
(“[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to sequester the jury during trial is within
the sound discretion of the trial court”) (quoting Belisle v. State, 11 So. 3d 256, 279
(Ala. Crim. App. 2007)); Com. v. Clark, 730 N.E.2d 872, 882 (Ma. 2000) (“The
decision whether to sequester a jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial
judge.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cordle, 587 N.E.2d 1372, 1377 (Ma. 1992)).
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judge’s discretion, but their statutes contain some restriction on
the circumstances under which a separation can be granted.
Specifically, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, and
Wyoming all allow a deliberating jury to separate “overnight.”215
Illinois and Iowa permit a deliberating jury to separate
overnight, on weekends, and in cases of emergency.216 South
Dakota allows separation until the next meeting of the court, but
there is no definition of that term to clarify whether that is the
next day the court is open for business or the date that the case is
next scheduled.217
Eight states, namely, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee, mandate
sequestration during deliberations in death penalty cases.218
However, Florida has express statutory authority for a trial judge
to separate a deliberating jury in emergency situations and also
permits sequestration to be waived if both the prosecution and
defense consent. Ohio also permits separation of a capital jury
when emergencies arise.
Only six states—Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas—mandate sequestration once
deliberations begin in all criminal cases.219 Texas mandates
sequestration when it is requested by either party or the court on
its own motion determines it to be appropriate. Kentucky
mandates sequestration when deliberations begin unless the
parties consent. The remaining four states do not have express
statutory authority permitting a judge to dispense with
sequestration once deliberations begin.220
215
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(a) (2018); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03(5)(3) (2018);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.391 (2017); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 23 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 111-207 (2018).
216
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 436(a) (2017); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.927(c) (2017); see also IOWA
R. CRIM. P. 2.19(5)(c) (2017).
217
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 23A-24-4 (2017).
218
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.370(c) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-142(a) (2017); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2126 (2017); IND. CODE § 35-37-2-4(b) (2017). But see Johnson v. Indiana,
749 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind. 2001) (holding that in capital cases, trial court must
sequester jury upon request of the defendant). MISS. R. CRIM. P. 18.8 (2016); MO.
REV. STAT. § 494.495 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.33 (2017); OHIO R. CRIM.
P. 24(h)(3) (2017) (authorizing separation of capital jury in cases of emergency);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-18-116 (2017).
219
KY. R. CRIM. P. § 9.66 (2017); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 791 (2017); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2022 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-22-02 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 857
(2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.23 (West 2017).
220
Although trial judges in these six states do not have discretion to dispense
with jury sequestration during deliberations, information provided to prospective
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States deal with claims of error associated with jury
sequestration in different ways.
Those that entrust
sequestration to the discretion of the trial court will review
decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.221 Claims of
error can include that the trial court improperly ordered
sequestration,222 or that the failure to sequester a jury deprived
the defendant of a fair trial in light of significant publicity on the
subject matter of the trial.223
Indiana, which mandates sequestration in capital cases
where the prosecution seeks the death penalty,224 seems to have
the strictest approach. Denial of a defendant’s request to
sequester the jury is reversible error.225 However, Indiana case
law supports the proposition that separation of a deliberating
jury in the case of an emergency is not, standing alone, a basis
for reversal.226

jurors in five of these states suggests that sequestration is a relatively rare
occurrence. See, e.g., You, The Jury, Juror Handbook, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY COURT OF JUSTICE, 11 (Nov. 2017), https://courts.ky.gov/resources/public
ationsresources/Publications/P7YoutheJury.pdf (“Occasionally, a judge will find it
necessary to sequester a jury, which requires keeping a jury overnight.”); North
Dakota Juror’s Handbook, NDCOURTS.GOV, available at http://www.nd
courts.gov/Court/juror.htm (last visited November 18, 2018) (noting that “it is rare in
North Dakota” for a jury to stay overnight); Jury Commission, ORLEANS CRIMINAL
DISTRICT COURT, http://www.criminalcourt.org/jury-commission (last visited
November 18, 2018) (noting that in Louisiana, “the only time one may be
sequestered while serving on a jury is on a 1st degree murder case”); Jury Service,
NEBRASKA
JUDICIAL
BRANCH,
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/programsservices/jury-service (last visited November 18, 2018) (noting that “occasionally, it
becomes necessary to keep a jury overnight . . . .”); Jury Selection and Trial Process,
DENTON
COUNTY,
TEXAS,
https://dentoncounty.com/Departments/DistrictClerk/Jury-Services/Jury-Selection-Trial-Process.aspx (last visited November 18,
2018) (“Sequestered juries are very rare . . . .”).
221
See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854, 868 (Cal. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Clark, 730 N.E.2d 872, 882 (Mass. 2000).
222
See People v. McCoy, 939 N.E. 2d 950, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“extremely
brief deliberations after a reference to sequestration may invite an inference that the
reference coerced the jury to render its verdict”) (internal citations omitted).
223
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966) (finding failure to
sequester jury or take additional precautions in light of the publicity surrounding
the case deprived defendant of a fair trial).
224
The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, Indiana Death Penalty Laws,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/dplaw.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
225
Lowery v. Indiana, 434 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ind. 1982); see also Johnson v.
Indiana, 749 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind. 2001).
226
Smith v. Indiana, 170 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ind. 1960).
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Florida also requires per se reversal for sequestration
violations, but has express statutory authorization permitting
separations of juries in cases of necessity.227 Although Ohio
permits separation of a deliberating jury in capital cases in an
emergency, the standard of review applied for alleged
sequestration violations depends on the nature of the violation
and whether the issue was preserved in the trial court.228
The remaining states that mandate sequestration at some
point in the case, either in all cases or only in capital cases,
analyze claimed sequestration violations in two ways:
(1) Kentucky, North Dakota, Mississippi, Missouri, and
Tennessee require a defendant to show prejudice before a
conviction will be reversed;229 (2) Louisiana, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Georgia, Texas, and Idaho presume prejudice but
permit the prosecution to rebut the presumption.230 In all of
227
Campbell v. Florida, 2 So. 3d 291, 294 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (“Unless the
record discloses an exceptional circumstance of emergency, accident or other special
necessity, or unless the parties have formally waived the requirement of
sequestration on the record, the trial judge has no discretion to deny sequestration,
and the failure to sequester deliberating jurors in a capital case is prejudicial
error.”).
228
Ohio v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 345 (Oh. 1956) (declining to “presume a
prejudice as a matter of law from the fact that some of the jurors made telephone
calls to members of their immediate families”).
229
See Gabow v. Kentucky, 34 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Ky. 2000) (“The general rule is
that a mere temporary separation of the jury is not grounds for reversal if it appears
that no definite prejudice resulted and there was no opportunity to tamper with the
jurors.”); North Dakota v. Weisz, 654 N.W.2d 416, 419 (N.D. 2002) (requiring a
showing of actual prejudice for sequestration violations and declining to adopt
Nebraska’s “rebuttable presumption of prejudice” approach); Simmons v. State, 805
So. 2d 452, 506 (Miss. 2001); Missouri v. Clay, 812 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Mo. 1991);
Gonzales v. Tennessee, 593 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tn. 1980) (reaffirming requirement
that an improper “separation may be explained by the prosecution, showing that the
juror had no communication with other persons, or that such communication was
upon subjects foreign to the trial, and that, in fact, no impressions other than those
drawn from the testimony, were made upon his mind . . . .”) (quoting Hines v.
Tennessee, 27. Tenn. 597, 602 (1848)).
230
Louisiana v. Jones, 794 So. 2d 107, 120 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (“[U]pon a
separation . . . a presumption of misconduct arises and reversible error will be
presumed. [However, where] circumstances are such as to reasonably overcome the
presumption of prejudice and where it affirmatively appears that no prejudice to the
accused could have resulted, the presumption may be rebutted . . . .”); Nebraska v.
Foster, 839 N.W.2d 783, 806 (Neb. 2013) (Failure to sequester a juror “creates a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice; and places the burden upon the prosecution to
show that no injury resulted.”) (internal citations omitted); Johnson v. Oklahoma, 93
P.3d 41, 47 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (“[W]hen a violation of [the sequestration]
statute occurs over defense objection prejudice is presumed and the burden falls to
the State to prove otherwise.”); Legare v. Georgia, 257 S.E.2d 247, 253 (Ga. 1979)
(“[T]here arises a legal presumption that the defendant has been injured [by the
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these jurisdictions, a mistrial is never warranted, absent
prejudice to the defendant, when the separation is caused by
some emergency.
New York’s statute should be similarly
construed.
VI. THE CASE FOR AMENDMENT
Although case law in New York supports the notion that an
unplanned separation of deliberating jurors does not warrant a
mistrial or reversal on appeal absent a showing of prejudice by
the defendant,231 the Legislature should nevertheless amend CPL
§ 310.10(2). The statute, on its face, grants no discretion to trial
courts to extend a recess in deliberations beyond the time
specified in the statute and such courts are understandably
reluctant to act in contravention of the statute’s plain language.
Efforts have been made to amend CPL § 310.10(2) to permit
judges, when appropriate, to adjourn deliberations for more than
24 hours. In 2016, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and
Procedure issued a report recommending the amendment of CPL
§ 310.10 to permit separation of jurors for a longer period of
time.232 The proposed law “retain[ed] the twenty-four hour limit
in most cases, but provid[ed], ‘upon good cause shown, an
additional period not to exceed 48 hours.’ ”233 The Committee
considered, but ultimately rejected, removing the time restraint
altogether. The latest proposal, which was introduced in the
New York State Assembly in 2017, authorized a separation for up
to 72 hours. That proposal passed the Assembly on June 21,
2017, but on January 3, 2018, the Senate returned the bill to the
Assembly without taking any action on it. The Assembly again
passed the bill, but the Senate again took no action.234
Each attempt to amend the law has dealt solely with
extending the acceptable length of any recess in deliberations
without conferring any general authority on judges to recess
deliberations when unforeseen circumstances arise that prevent
improper separation of a jury] and it is incumbent upon the state to have rebutted
that legal presumption . . . .”); Idaho v. Rodriguez, 460 P.2d 711, 714 (Idaho 1969);
Harris v. State, 738 S.W. 2d 207, 222 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1987).
231
See supra notes 207–09.
232
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE TO
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 22
(2016).
233
Id.
234
For a complete history and text of this bill, see http://nyassembly.gov/leg/
?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A07448&term=2017 (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
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a deliberating juror from returning to court within the statutorily
required time period. Accordingly, CPL § 310.10(2) should be
amended as follows:
At any time after the jury has been charged or commenced its
deliberations, and after notice to the parties and affording such
parties an opportunity to be heard on the record outside of the
presence of the jury, the court may declare the deliberations to
be in recess and may thereupon direct the jury to suspend its
deliberations and to separate for a reasonable period of time to
be specified by the court not to exceed forty-eight hours.
However, in the case of a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, or an
unforeseen circumstance that makes it impractical to resume
deliberations, such separation may extend beyond such fortyeight hour period. Before each recess, the court must admonish
the jury as provided in § 270.40 of this chapter and direct it not
to resume its deliberations until all twelve jurors have
reassembled in the designated place at the termination of the
declared recess.

The amendment would have several benefits. It would afford
the approximately two-thirds of all trial judges in New York
County Supreme Court who are designated as calendar judges
one full day per week to handle the other cases pending before
them.235 That means that on the same day each week, a trial
judge who is also a calendar judge would be able to preside over
about fifty additional cases that are scheduled either for
arraignment, for decision on a pre-trial motion, or for a guilty
plea. Although it is not possible for a calendar judge to preside
over the trial of every case pending before her, it is possible and
strongly preferable to have the same judge preside over the case
from arraignment to the start of the trial. A judge who presides
over all pre-trial aspects of the case is naturally going to be
better informed about the facts and circumstances of it, and thus
be able to make far more informed decisions.
An alternative solution, namely assigning all pending cases
to a handful of calendar judges to determine all pre-trial matters,
thereby freeing up the remaining judges to handle only trials, is
untenable.
In New York County alone, there were 6,538
indictments filed in 2016.236 Although this alternative solution
would allow trial judges to try cases to verdict without
interrupting jury deliberations for a calendar day, the resulting
235
236

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
STATE OF OUR JUDICIARY 2017: EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE YEAR ONE 10 (2017).
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caseloads of the calendar judges would be unmanageable, making
it difficult, if not impossible, for these judges to make informed
decisions on these cases.
In addition to affording judges the express authority to
recess deliberations to accommodate a calendar day, the proposed
amendment would serve to dispel any doubt that judges have
discretion to adjourn deliberations in the event that a juror does
return to court. Delegating the length of an adjournment to the
sound discretion of a trial judge in these unique and limited
circumstances would not open the door to abuse or encourage
deliberations to be unnecessarily extended because of lengthy
recesses. Judges make decisions of equal or greater magnitude
in their day-to-day responsibilities of presiding over criminal
trials. There is no reason why the Legislature should not give
them express—but limited—authority to handle a far more basic
concern, namely the scheduling of jury deliberations. As with so
many other judicial determinations made in the heat of trial, this
one will be reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.
Creating express statutory authority for a judge to extend a
recess in deliberations under very limited circumstances also
would not cause unnecessary delays of trials. Trial judges are
under significant pressure to expeditiously resolve cases so that
other matters can be sent to them for trial. In New York County,
court personnel, referred to as “expediters,” continuously check
the status of all trials to ensure that the cases are moving
expeditiously and that judges who have recently resolved a
case—through plea or trial—are quickly assigned another case to
preside over.237 Further, the New York State Unified Court
System is committed to decreasing the time it takes to resolve
criminal cases. This “Excellence Initiative,” involves “a top-tobottom examination of court operations focused on improving the
courts’ ability to ensure the just and timely resolution of all
matters that come before them—our core obligation as the
judicial branch of government.”238 The report of this initiative
sets out detailed changes in the court system to ensure that cases
are more expediently brought to a resolution. In light of this
commitment, it would be difficult for anyone to argue that trial
judges, even with unfettered discretion, would recess
deliberations unnecessarily.
237
NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
1jd/criminal/department.shtml#Case.
238
Id.
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Trial judges also have a responsibility to the sworn jurors to
keep the case on schedule and to avoid unnecessary delay.239
Before jury selection begins, the panel of prospective jurors is
informed of the anticipated length of the trial. This allows the
trial judge to excuse potential jurors who are unable to serve
because of some legitimate scheduling concern.
Recessing
deliberations, or any other part of the trial unnecessarily, risks
extending the case beyond the time in which the sworn jurors are
available to serve. And if the trial is unnecessarily extended to a
day in which one or more sworn jurors is no longer available, a
mistrial may be required.240
In sum, depriving judges of express statutory authority to
extend recesses in deliberations beyond 24 hours is an
unnecessary and unworkable restraint on judicial discretion.
Such a restraint does not ensure the integrity of deliberations,
nor does it make it any less likely that jurors will engage in some
form of misconduct or that others may attempt to influence them.
This was conclusively demonstrated when the Office of Court
Administration began collecting data when CPL § 310.10(2) was
enacted in 1995 to permit jury separation in trials of certain
lower level felonies.241 The data included 935 cases where the
jurors were permitted to separate. “[I]n no case were allegations
raised that jurors were intimidated, tampered with or improperly
contacted during separation.”242
Further, the most important factor in assuring that a jury
remains fair and impartial is the jury selection process. During
that process, the parties select jurors who can not only fairly
evaluate the evidence, but who can also follow the trial judge’s
instructions. Those instructions include not speaking to anyone
about the trial, not doing any research about the case or the
parties, and not going on the internet or social media to attempt
to learn more about the case.243 To posit that a recess that

239
See NYS UNITED COURT SYSTEM PETIT JUROR’S HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.nyjuror.gov/pdfs/hb_Petit.pdf (“We are keenly aware that New Yorkers
have busy lives and that you have many demands on your time. Knowing that, we
have transformed the jury system, by increasing the jury pool and reducing the
length of jury service . . . .”).
240
See supra text accompanying notes 51–53.
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HON. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, SEPARATION AND SEQUESTRATION OF
DELIBERATING JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 5 (1999).
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Id. at 12.
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Jury Admonitions in Preliminary Instructions, NYCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Jury_Admonitions.pdf.
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extends beyond the next business day would have any effect on
jurors who have survived the selection process undermines the
value of that process and the seriousness that sworn jurors place
on their responsibility to decide a criminal case. It is a wellsettled principle that trial jurors are presumed to follow a judge’s
instructions.244 The same confidence that the system places in
jurors abiding by a trial judge’s admonitions during all recesses
in the trial, should similarly be placed in their ability to abide by
those instructions during an unexpected but limited extension of
a particular recess.
CONCLUSION
Allowing defendants to move for and obtain mistrials based
upon a delay in resuming jury deliberations does nothing to
render the process fairer or to protect any right of a defendant.
Granting these applications in the absence of prejudice to a
defendant wastes scarce and valuable judicial resources, requires
the state to unnecessarily retry a case, and makes witnesses
again take time from their lives to testify in court. Indeed, in
many cases, a defendant is afforded a tactical advantage by
forcing the state to retry the case. There are of course occasions
when the law accepts conferring a tactical advantage on a
defendant as “a tolerable side effect of the protection of
defendants’ most basic rights,”245 but there is no right of a
defendant that is affected when a jury deliberation recess is
extended beyond the period specified in CPL § 310.10(2).
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People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266, 274, 926 N.E.2d 240, 245, 899 N.Y.S.2d 733,
738 (2010).
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People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 827, 838, 18 N.E.3d 367, 375, 993 N.Y.S.2d 656,
664 (2014) (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).

